Algeria Threatening Maghreb, Euro-Med Trading Region: Report

Med-Atlantic has received a copy of a report by a Washington-based intelligence service, Global Information System (GIS), which says that Algeria’s defense moves, including its ambitious military procurement program, is not only de-stabilizing the Maghreb, but also jeopardizing the emerging Mediterranean trading region which links Europe into the North African market.

The full report of 26 March 2008, is as follows:
Maghreb Balance Becomes More Delicate, But the Challenges to the “Greater European” Trading Arena, and Western Interests, Become More Clear

The rejection by the Algerian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Jaza’eriya/Armée de l'air algérienne) of its order for 36 MiG-29 combat aircraft (29 single-seat MiG-29SMT Fulcrum fighters and six two-seat MiG-29UB) after the delivery of initial batches of the type through 2007 might seem at first to indicate that Algeria was likely to delay its acquisition of some of its advanced combat capability, allowing neighboring Morocco a chance of at least a brief window of parity when it acquires its proposed 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 50+ fighters.

The Algerian decision to reject the 15 MiG-29SMTs already delivered, on quality grounds originally raised by Belorussian technicians, however, holds the seeds of making the Algerian Air Force even more advanced than other states in the region. Indeed, it places Algeria in the position of being a strategically significant force in the Mediterranean, and one which is again following its 20th Century tradition of alliance with Russia. This once again makes the Mediterranean a region of interesting strategic maneuver as the world moves back to a period of a new Cold War structuring, albeit a new Cold War based on factors other than ideology.

The significance of the Algerian move from a MiG-29SMT-based air combat capability is that it seems likely now to be replaced by MiG-35 capability, albeit at a later date and a slower pace of delivery. It has been suggested by Moscow that the unsatisfactory MiG-29SMTs could be ultimately replaced by significantly superior MiG-29M2s or MiG-35s.

On January 26, 2006, it was announced that Russia would sell $4-billion worth of new arms to Algeria (Iranian sources said that the deal was actually worth $7.5-billion), in a deal which would include 36 MiG-29SMT and 28 Su-30 combat aircraft, eight divisions of Almaz-Antei S-300MPU2 Favorit air defense systems, as well as a quantity of T-90 battle tanks and supporting combat vehicles and artillery pieces. Under the deal, Russia was to sign additional contracts for the upgrade of Soviet-made arms already in Algerian service. The contracts had been ratified and were expected to be signed during Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin’s visit to Algeria in late February or March 2006. The systems would be paid for in a complex scheme involving striking off part of Algeria’s Soviet debt. As well, Algeria was believed to have indicated that it would buy up to 50 Yak-130 advanced training aircraft and about 30 Tunguska-M1 air defense systems.

Some $1.28-billion of the deal was for the MiG-29s. However, in October 2007, Algeria stopped payments on other military contracts in the package pending the return of the MiGs. As noted, Russia moved quickly to remedy the situation by offering more advanced, and truly new, aircraft, even though this will clearly involve some time-lag in deliveries.

In buying the supposedly new MiG-29SMT fighters from Russia, Algeria was paying off its debt to the former USSR. As part of the payment, Russia offered to take back 36 old MiGs which had been bought by Algeria from Ukraine and Belarus, and flown by the Algerian Air Force. The “new” MiG-29SMTs, however, were understood to be refurbished Soviet-era airframes, not built to the same quality levels of current-generation MiG-29s. It may have been that only by using existing, stockpiled airframes that Russia could have met the Algerian delivery schedule which had the “new” aircraft in Algerian Air Force hands within about a year.

The US Government, meanwhile, worked hard to pressure neighboring Morocco away from its purchase of 18 to 24 AMD Rafale fourth-generation combat aircraft from France, despite the fact that the Rafale — more capable in air combat than the F-16C — would have been a far more effective deterrent against any Algerian adventurism with its MiGs and Sukhois. Moreover, despite the price differential in the Rafale over the F-16, it was likely that Saudi Arabia would have helped supplement the Moroccan budget to buy the Rafale. It can only be assumed that the US advised Saudi Arabia against such an action, so that Lockheed Martin would be able to continue its F-16 production line until the F-35 was in series production. Moreover, although Morocco is a major non-NATO ally of the US and has contributed a lot to the so-called “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), the Bush Administration insists that Rabat pays for the F-16s in full rather than offer them as a US military aid program.

The strategic balance in the south-western Mediterranean is of critical importance globally because it determines the stability of the Strait of Gibraltar and all of Europe’s southern flank. But while most Western analysts feel that the southern Mediterranean — or Maghrebi — balance is only of academic interest, given the belief that there is no long-term desire or interest on the part of any state there to confront Western or European interests, the reality is that stability in the region is likely to be undermined progressively if Algeria achieves its anticipated military dominance of the area.

Indeed, the ability of the Maghreb to influence stability in southern Europe — as evidenced by the actions of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi during the Cold War — has been forgotten, and the prospect of a stable, advanced, and economically integrated Maghreb as part of the European economy is too little discussed. And that is quite apart from Russia attempting to use its traditional links to the area to secure at least some leverage vis-à-vis Western Europe for the future. Gazprom’s growing involvement in the Algerian natural gas industry will increase the Russian influence over the European energy market.

The problem is not specifically that Algeria would deliberately work against European or Western interests, but, rather, the reality that it is structurally preoccupied with its own internal problems and with its historical pursuit of geographic expansion. Indeed, much of its recent defense modernization purchases — the January 2006 package of arms purchases from Russia — is about ensuring Algeria’s ability to intimidate Morocco over the question of the future of Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS). The future of MWS is an immediate issue challenging Algeria and Morocco, and while Morocco has prevailed legally in asserting its historical claims to the Sahara following a fairly brief period of Spanish colonial occupation of the area, Algeria has succeeded in staving off full acceptance by the international community of Morocco’s position.

The growth of Algeria’s military position, designed to ultimately give Algeria dominance over an “independent” MWS so that Algeria could have direct access to the Atlantic, among other things, will force Morocco into developing other regional alliances. The US has not proven a reliable ally; it has served to reinforce Algeria’s claims to the WMS at least to the extent that it has ‘brokered’ international negotiations which have essentially overridden the legal ownership by Morocco of MWS as confirmed by the World Court. And France cannot commit totally to Morocco, given the reality that it has historically regarded Algeria as its most important ally in the Maghreb. So Morocco would be forced to seek broader and more complex solutions, as it has done in the past.

These include the fact that Morocco has prevailed in the Muslim world on the matter: not one Arab League state recognizes the Algerian front organization, POLISARIO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro), as the legitimate controlling power of Western Sahara. And Morocco has progressively reduced the number of African Union (AU) states which recognize Western Sahara as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

But Morocco will need to do more to counterbalance Algerian military growth, and this will include supporting the viability of Libya as a regional power. This holds some dangers for as long as Libya is in the hands of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, despite the “brother Colonel’s” failing health. Despite the relatively static situation in Libya, because of Col. Qadhafi’s relative quiescence of late, the deal struck between France and Libya in December 2007 is fairly positive for Morocco and cautionary for Algeria.

That deal reportedly included the Libyan purchase of 35 Eurocopter military helicopters, including 10 Tiger attack, 15 EC725 Caracal multi-mission utility, 10 AS550 Fennec liaison/training helicopters; César 155mm truck-mounted SP howitzers; 60 VAB wheeled armored vehicles; 13 Sagaie wheeled armored vehicles; 25 VBL armored scout/liaison vehicles; eight fast patrol boats; air-defense radars; and the modernization of 12+ AMD Mirage F-1C combat aircraft in the Libyan Air Force inventory.

Clearly, neither the Moroccan nor the Libyan purchases cause Algeria too much concern at this point, but the reality is that Algeria — given its commitment to Russia for historical and debt-reduction reasons — has little with which to bargain with Paris or the US. Logically, then, Algiers will begin to step up its diplomacy in Paris and Washington over the coming year, largely to balance out the fact that it had appeared to have given all its support to Russia. Algeria may even throw some orders — for civilian or military capital goods — the way of France or the US. Indeed, France already offered to sell the Rafale fighter to Algeria, and it was only rejected in favor of the Russian deal on the grounds of costs and the ability to reduce old Algerian debt to the USSR (debt which was assumed as payable, post-Soviet, to Russia).

Thus the diplomatic battle between Algeria and Morocco will gain momentum in Europe and the US, largely to seek or deny incremental movements in the United Nations-sponsored talks on the Moroccan Western Sahara. What will be of significance, then, is whether the Europeans or the US will take the broader view of their interests in how the Maghreb maneuvering evolves. Or whether, as in the past, they will allow the Sahara dispute to continue to be “created” by Algeria as part of the ongoing Algerian expansion.