Morocco’s F-16 Deal: It’s Not Done Until It’s Done

US officials have conveniently leaked the “fact” that the Royal Moroccan Air Force has agreed to buy 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D fighter aircraft for something less than US$2 billion, thus driving out the competition from France, which had hoped to sell some 24 AMD Rafale fighters — a much more advanced combat aircraft than the F-16 — for around US2.3 billion. But the deal is far from wrapped up. Sure, the F-16 deal is attractive: more numbers of a still-pretty-good second/third generation fighter for a much cheaper price. But real questions persist for Morocco.

Firstly, will the F-16s, even if the RMAF gets truly advanced versions, be able to match neighboring Algeria’s 28 new Su-30 air superiority fighters which were ordered in 2006? On a one-on-one air combat engagement, almost certainly not, unless the RMAF has some really significant additional sensors and command and control capabilities from the US, to go along with the aircraft. Frankly, Algeria also has a lot more than just the new Su-30s, but that would be Morocco’s primary threat, along with the 24 Mikoyan MiG-29A and 8 MiG-29UB Fulcrum air superiority fighters already in service and demonstrably capable of defeating F-16s in air combat maneuvering.

Secondly, quite apart from operational capability, will the US even allow Morocco to use the new fighters where and when they will be needed? What we are seeing now is the standard US negotiating tactic. First, get an agreement to buy, locking out the foreign competition, and then start hedging the sale with conditions on deployment, and on just what onboard systems will be sold to make the aircraft truly effective.

As well, the negotiations are just beginning on exactly what “Block” of F-16 the US will allow for sale to the RMAF. At worst, given Morocco’s position as a major non-NATO US ally, it should be at least the Block 52, similar to that being negotiated for Pakistan, but in reality, to match the Su-30s of Algeria, it would need to be at least Block 60 (à la the United Arab Emirates).

Certainly, the price is important for Morocco, even if Saudi Arabia helps out somewhat with the budget, as promised. But Morocco needs to be able to present a credible deterrence against Algerian use of force to support and sustain its surrogate force — POLISARIO — which is trying to break Morocco’s Saharan territory away from the Kingdom. Right now, Morocco is maneuvering brilliantly to make its case in the international community regarding the historical validity of Morocco as the legitimate owner of what was, for a time, the colonial territory of “Spanish Sahara”. The African states which Algeria had wooed into recognizing POLISARIO as the claimant to the area have now begun walking away from that position ... in large numbers. And no Arab League states ever supported Algeria on that.

Algeria, however, is determined to gain access through a surrogate POLISARIO state to the Atlantic. And expansionist Algeria has fought with Morocco before over border issues. And lost. Its massive new arms build-up, including the Su-30s and much more, are designed to ensure that Morocco’s adroit political maneuvering will not be a match for brute force in the future.

Morocco is, arguably, far more strategically important to the US than Algeria, and yet the US State Department seems bent, always, on treating Morocco with less support than its record as an unimpeachable ally should warrant. So there is an attempt to circumscribe the use of the F-16s, and to limit their capabilities.

Morocco needs to keep the door open to a possible acquisition of Rafales. They could indeed match the Su-30s, and ensure that the close Moroccan relationship with France — enhanced since the election to the French Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy — is strengthened and France’s also-important relationship with Algeria is circumscribed.

Indeed, Washington, for its part, needs to start taking into account the reality of history on Moroccan Sahara and also the growing democratic governance of Morocco, and start seeing Algeria’s constant attempts to expand for what they are.
We'll be talking more about Morocco’s great electoral transformation in the September 2007 elections, and about some great documentation on the realities of Saharan history.