Morocco's King Mohammed VI on November 6, 2008, took a profound and decisive step to break the decades of logjam on the issue of its Western Sahara territory. The King's policy statement, on the 33rd anniversary of the Green March his father led into the territory, served notice that the issue of Morocco's sovereignty over the region (which has already been reaffirmed by international courts) would no longer be held to ransom by the Algerian-sponsored POLISARIO movement.
King Mohammed was more than diplomatic in his speech, but the bottom line was clear: Morocco was now unified, and the debate over the region was, effectively, at an end. Moreover, Morocco was now pursuing its strategic integration with the European Union (EU) in the context of a broader Mediterranean trading basin.
As has been the case in the past, the Washington, DC-based "Defense & Foreign Affairs" publication, "Strategic Policy", captured the essence of the new strategic reality. The following is the text of that report, which appeared today, November 17, 2008:
Morocco Seizes the Initiative
Frustrated by decades of external intervention, Morocco has now taken steps to consolidate Moroccan Western Sahara into the Kingdom, and to move closer to the EU.
Morocco, on November 6, 2008, took a decisive step toward resolving the Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS) dispute, a step of strategic importance to the European Union (EU), the Maghreb, and a range of other issues.
The step moved Morocco toward ending the decades of stalemate induced by interference — and failed initiatives — by the international community, allies, and adversaries alike. The move is likely to be met with antagonism by the Government of Algeria and by the increasingly-isolated Algerian-backed POLISARIO movement (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro) which has claimed to represent the Saharan citizens of Morocco.
Morocco’s King Mohammed VI on November 6, 2008, delivered a major speech on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of the Green March which the late King Hassan II had led to assert the unity of MWS into the Kingdom after the period of Spanish colonial occupation. King Mohammed used the anniversary speech to outline the launch of pivotally-important domestic and governance reforms in the context of seeking a permanent solution for the MWS dispute. The speech, which was carefully constructed to address regional and international diplomatic sensitivities, built up to the key element, which, at its core, ensured that the MWS issue would no longer remain stagnated.
The King started his speech by setting the overall political context for Morocco’s decision regarding MWS. He stressed Morocco’s commitment to reaching a negotiated settlement — based on the Autonomy Plan for MWS — through the United Nations (UN) process. “Morocco is confirming that it is fully prepared to engage in serious negotiations on autonomy [for MWS] as a final solution to the dispute,” the King stated. The implementation of the reform program he would subsequently underline would not come at the expense of the UN negotiations. Hence, the Moroccan autonomy initiative “will remain on the table, to be discussed within the framework of the United Nations.” Rabat is expecting the UN talks to eventually succeed, the King noted, because “Morocco is confident that reason and a forward-looking vision — rather than obsolete views and illusions of the past — will eventually prevail.”
However, the King stressed, the mere progress in international arena did not constitute a viable substitute to the imperative that Morocco assume responsibility for its own destiny and vital interests. “Whatever the developments concerning our national cause at regional or international level, Morocco will continue to rely on itself and uphold its legitimate rights,” the King emphasized. He further asserted that Morocco would remain “vigilant and mobilized and will preserve the cohesion and unity of the internal front, which is the source of our strength”. At the same time, even when adopting its own programs, Morocco still hoped that the international community would remain involved in consultations and advice for the development of the Moroccan initiative. “Thanks to the encouragement and support of the international community, several UN and international institutions have, since, reconsidered their stance on the issue,” the King explained. The UNSC [UN Security Council], for example, endorsed the Moroccan initiative and discarded all other “obsolete, unrealistic proposals, which lack any real vision for the future.”
The King then turned to Morocco’s relations with Algeria, Morocco’s main neighbor and the POLISARIO’s chief patron and sponsor. The King stressed that “Morocco has shown that it is genuinely willing to make a distinction between the regional dispute over the Sahara and a desire for improved bilateral relations with Algeria”. The King expressed Morocco’s regret that Algeria’s official policy “has been to thwart the positive thrust generated by the Moroccan initiative, using its energies to maintain the status quo, with the risk of balkanization of the Maghreb and Sahel regions, at a time when profound regional and global changes require us to rally together to tackle decisive development challenges and security risks.”
The King lamented Algeria’s seemingly inexplicable, adamant refusals to normalize cross-border relations. “The continued rejection [by Algeria] not only of all Moroccan steps to normalize relations, but also those proposed by sister and friendly nations, including influential members of the international community, is, from both an historical and geographical perspective, quite illogical; as illogical, in fact, as the closed borders between the two sister nations.” The King reiterated Morocco’s “keen desire to have open borders and normal relations stems from a firm commitment to brotherhood and good neighborliness, from our attachment to people’s right to free movement and exchange, and from our eagerness to achieve the integration of Maghreb countries, which is inevitable.”
The crux of the speech was the King’s decision — and statement — that Morocco had resolved to unilaterally implement the “sophisticated process of regionalization” which would ultimately provide all Moroccans (ie: including those of MWS) with a new system of local governance. Given the immense diversity of the population of Morocco — a tapestry of nations and tribes — the new policy of regionalization would enable all Moroccan to better secure and express their distinction and traditions within the framework of unified yet diverse Morocco. In practical terms, the King talked about granting more powers to the local governments so that they could adapt to the distinct character and traditions of every population group and region of the country. Essentially, the King announced the launch of a process of profound domestic reforms in Morocco, both structurally (redis- tricting) and governance-wise (region- alization).
The King stressed that Morocco could no longer postpone domestic reforms until there was commensurate progress in the international arena. “Whatever the developments concerning our national cause at regional or international level, Morocco will continue to rely on itself and uphold its legitimate rights. It will remain vigilant and mobilized and will preserve the cohesion and unity of the internal front, which is the source of our strength,” the King stated. Therefore, even while waiting for the international community to deliver negotiated solutions for the MWS, the King explained, “Morocco cannot afford to remain idle; nor can it allow the country’s development and democratic process to be subject to the tactics and maneuvers of others”.
Therefore, the King announced, he had decided “to open a new page in the ongoing reforms” he had been spearheading. Toward this end, Morocco “shall soon be launching a gradual, sophisticated process of regionalization which will cover all parts of the Kingdom, especially the Moroccan Sahara region. I am keen to enable all the inhabitants and sons of the Moroccan Sahara to run their local affairs democratically, within a unified Moroccan nation, either through the implementation of an appropriate, broad-based regionalization system — which will reflect the will of the nation — or through the proposed autonomy statute, once a UN-sponsored consensual political agreement is reached as a final solution to this dispute.”
Significantly, the reform program would apply equally to all Moroccans, from the Mediterranean to the Mauritanian border, and from the Atlantic coast to the Algerian border. The King stressed the profound significance of the reform process and outlined the roadmap for the nation.
Regionalization implies a major structural reform which requires collective efforts for its development and finalization. To this end, I wish to share with you a roadmap which spells out the project’s fundamental elements, objectives and proposed action.
We have far-reaching ambitions in this respect. Our aim is to enable good local governance to take a firm hold, respond more closely to the citizens’ needs and boost integrated, regional economic, social and cultural development.
In order to achieve these objectives, the proposed reform should be based on unity, balance and solidarity.
By unity we mean the unity of the state, of the homeland and of our territory. Indeed, there can be no region- alization except within the framework of this unity.
As for balance, it can be achieved through a clear definition of the exclusive powers of the state and those of regional institutions, so that the latter may discharge their mission with regard to development, taking into account the necessity for rational action, coherence and complementarity.
National solidarity is the cornerstone of advanced regionalization since the devolution of powers to the region goes hand in hand with the need to provide the necessary public funds and promote self-generated income.
Successful regionalization also hinges on efficient districting so as to have regions that are economically and geographically integrated, as well as socially and culturally coherent.”
The King announced the establishment of a committee of experts which would formulate the specifics and details of the program. He then reiterated the changes in the country’s system of governance, namely, the empowerment of local governments at the expense of centralized authorities. The King stressed that he had already urged the Government “to prepare a national devolution charter which should lead to an effective system for the management of devolved powers. This system, designed to usher in a complete change from rigid centralized management, is to be based on a territorial approach that aims to ensure the devolution of central powers to external services, which should, themselves, be organized into regional technical hubs. The charter should also include the appropriate legal mechanisms needed for territorial governance and enable walis and governors to carry out their mission, especially with respect to supervising the efficiency of state action and coordinating the work of the various stakeholders concerned at territorial, provincial and regional levels.”
Taken together, the reform process the King announced constitutes a major stride toward further democratization and greater freedoms — both personal and communal — for all Moroccans. The King thus ushered in a profound initiative. The King concluded that “whatever the circumstances, the Kingdom of Morocco will remain true to its cultural identity as an open nation, encouraged and inspired by the credibility enjoyed by the Moroccan model at regional and international levels.”
The reform process introduced by King Mohammed VI makes perfect sense in the aftermath of the Parliamentary elections and the analysis of the situation in MWS made by the then personal envoy of the UN Secretary General’s Envoy for Western Sahara. The King’s reforms constitute a direct evolution of the conclusions of the September 7, 2007, elections and recommendations of the UN senior official most knowledgeable about the MWS.
The parliamentary elections conclusively demonstrated that the population of MWS considered themselves an integral part of the Kingdom. The parliamentary elections were a major step in the modernization and democratization campaign initiated and led by King Mohammed VI. The King and Government clearly committed to these elections convinced that these objectives could not be realized without concurrent domestic reforms, particularly democratic reforms and individual rights.
See: Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, September 10, 2007: Moroccan Elections Delivery Major Message on Stability, Direction, and Give Strength on Saharan Process.
The most telling outcome of the elections was the analysis of the voters’ turnout. The national average was 37 percent, the lowest in Morocco’s history and a manifestation of the population’s rejection of the traditional political parties offering “panacea solution” for the country’s problems. This was clear from the difference between the turnout in the Royalist conservative rural areas — 43 percent — and the urban areas — 30 percent — where the absenteeism in the urban slums was overwhelming. Since the slums are the bastion of the Islamists’ and socialists’ power, the voters demonstrated their disappointment and rejection by not voting (since these areas do not have the traditional power structure because of the weakening of the tribal/clan hold on society, there were no viable alternatives to the Islamist and socialist candidates who people could vote for).
The voting patterns in the MWS merit special attention. In a sharp contrast with the low turnout in the urban centers of northern Morocco - the voters’ turnout in the MWS was extremely heavy (Dakhla 62 percent; Smara 58 percent, El Ayoune 50 percent). This is a clear demonstration that the population in MWS considered itself Moroccan, convinced that it had vital stakes in the political process in Rabat, and determined to have its say there. Indeed, foreign observers reported vibrant voting and political discourse throughout MWS. As well, no violations and improprieties were reported. Thus, the Moroccan parliamentary elections in MWS — more than a “referendum” — demonstrated that the local population considered itself an integral part of a single, unified Morocco.
On the basis of the election conclusions, Morocco should have been encouraged to complete the reforms initiated by the King.
Eager to resolve the MWS crisis within the framework of the UN, Morocco introduced in the Autumn of 2007 an extensive Autonomy Plan which won praise from the US and most world powers. Subsequently, Morocco engaged in several rounds of the UN-sponsored negotiations in Manhasset, New York. The rigidity demonstrated by both the Algerian Government and the POLISARIO leadership convinced most UN observers that the only viable solution for the MWS problem should be based on inclusion within Morocco, whether based on the Moroccan Autonomy plan or other arrangement securing the population’s individual and communal rights.
Peter van Walsum, then the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara, could not remain silent. On April 22, 2008, he faxed lengthy comments faxed to UNSC members in which he injected pragmatism and realism into the process. Van Walsum stressed the need to introduce “political reality” into the ongoing UN-sponsored negotiations process. As it was then, he stressed, the Manhasset talks process was at an impasse. “For the Frente POLISARIO, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation,” van Walsum wrote. No amount of international mediation was going to break this deadlock. Moreover, the international community had its own vested interests in the region and conflict.
Consequently, van Walsum wrote, he had “concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition”. For a viable agreement to be reached, he stressed, both sides should negotiate “on the assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of independence”. Failing to adopt realistic solution, he warned, would only aggravate the crisis in MWS. “I felt the need to reiterate this conclusion that Western Sahara independence is not a goal that can be attained,” van Walsum concluded. Peter van Walsum was forced to resign soon afterwards specifically for speaking his mind and stating the obvious.
Since then, the Manhasset talks process became moribund.
Meanwhile, Morocco was making strides in the international arena. Most important was the EU’s decision, on October 13, 2008, to grant Morocco “advanced status” with the EU, comparable to that of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Morocco’s “advanced status” includes the setting up of a “common economic space” based on the rules of the European Economic Area, comprising the EU nations plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Foreign Affairs Minister Taib Fassi-Fihri noted that Brussels and Rabat would draw up an “ambitious roadmap which will significantly boost the bilateral relations at all levels and lay the foundations of a new statutory step, in line with the assets, progress and ambitions of Morocco and the EU”.
Morocco’s new partnership with the EU “extends the scope of relations in their strategic, political, economic, and human dimensions.” Under the agreement, Morocco will also participate in a number of European agencies, such as Europol, the European Air Security Agency and the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction. Significantly, Fassi Fihri explained, the new “advanced status” agreement with the EU could form a road map towards a new formal bilateral agreement after 2013.
Such circumstances made it imperative for Morocco to complete implementing the King’s extensive domestic reform process so that a unified Morocco could begin de facto inclusion in the EU. The November 6, 2008, speech by King Mohammed VI was critical, then, in outlining what Morocco would do in the near future.
Monday, November 17, 2008
Monday, May 12, 2008
UN SecGen Defies Own Advisor to Keep POLISARIO in the Game
What is the United Nations Secretary-General doing? The legalities of the Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS) situation have long been settled. Algeria-backed POLISARIO has been discredited and has been losing support from all but the dedicated leftist international movements who see it as “revolutionary”, and the population of WMS was happy to be part of the increasingly prosperous Moroccan polity.
Even the UN’s key advisor agreed that POLISARIO’s day had come and gone, but the Secretary-General couldn’t bring himself to see the situation resolved.
The situation in MWS returned briefly to world attention between UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC in mid-April 2008 and the ensuing UNSC Resolution 1813 of April 30, 2008, which extended the MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) peacekeeping mandate by a full year instead of the usual six-monthly term, while the UN Secretary-General expressed the view that the current negotiations were unlikely to succeed.
Throughout, there emerged a widening gap between the public perception of the diplomatic process as conveyed by the media, and the reality as manifested in the letter of the legal documents as well as close examination of statements for the record of pertinent key officials. Ultimately, what seemed to be a major achievement for Moroccan diplomacy turned out to be a tentative potential for a breakthrough ONLY if properly capitalized on by official Rabat.
The Ban Ki-Moon report to the UNSC foretold trouble. Praising the repeatedly reiterated commitment of both Morocco and the Algerian-backed POLISARIO rebel movement to continue their negotiations, the report acknowledged that so far there has been no sign of any breakthrough in the dispute. “Momentum can only be maintained by trying to find a way out of the current political impasse through realism and a spirit of compromise from both parties,” Ban Ki-Moon wrote. Therefore, he added, it was imperative that the UNSC [UN Security Council] impress upon both sides that they must enter into “a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations without any preconditions”. However, the report stressed, both sides have intractable preconditions. Morocco insists on retaining Moroccan sovereignty while the POLISARIO insists on a referendum in which the population can choose between independence and Moroccan rule.
Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC concluded that the current negotiations procedures were unlikely to break the impasse and deliver a tangible solution to the MWS problem.
On April 22, 2008, in lengthy comments faxed to UNSC members, Peter van Walsum, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara, injected pragmatism and realism into the process. Van Walsum stressed the need to introduce “political reality” into the ongoing UN-sponsored negotiations process. As it was now, he stressed, the Manhasset, New York, talks process was at an impasse. “For the Frente POLISARIO, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation,” van Walsum wrote.
No amount of international mediation was going to break this deadlock. Moreover, the international community had its own vested interests in the region and conflict. Consequently, van Walsum wrote, he had “concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition”. For a viable agreement to be reached, he stressed, both sides should negotiate “on the assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of independence”. Failing to adopt realistic solution, he warned, would only aggravate the crisis in MWS. “I felt the need to reiterate this conclusion that Western Sahara independence is not a goal that can be attained,” van Walsum concluded.
Van Walsum’s memo created a stir, particularly among the POLISARIO and its supporters. Muhammad Khadad, a member of the POLISARIO leadership, called van Walsum’s remarks “ridiculous”, and vowed never to accept them. An Arab diplomat sympathetic to the POLISARIO said that van Walsum’s attempt to present his “personal view failed, because the only basis for negotiation in the future will be Mr. Ban’s official report”. Privately, however, Arab observers and diplomats concurred with van Walsum, as Mohammad el-Ashab noted in the influential Al-Hayat. “Peter van Walsum did not reveal anything new when he said that independence was ‘unrealistic’ for the disputed territory,” el-Ashab wrote.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon immediately distanced himself from Peter van Walsum’s observations. Ban Ki-Moon let it be known that he was reluctant to challenge the legal status quo. Ban Ki-Moon reiterated that his report to the UNSC urged the continuation of negotiations “without preconditions”, thus dropping van Walsum’s recommendation that the UN further a pragmatic attainable solution.
Hence, on the night of April 30, 2008, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1813, which was essentially more-of-the-same. The UNSC urged both parties to enter into “a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations” to resolve their bitter dispute. The UNSC specified that both parties should “continue with negotiations without preconditions,” and in good faith “with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution”. However, in a nod to van Walsum, the UNSC welcomed the “serious and credible Moroccan efforts” to move the negotiations process along, while only “taking note” of the POLISARIO’s proposals. At the same time, the UNSC endorsed Ban Ki-Moon’s observation that “realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations”.
UNSC Resolution 1813 also renewed the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until April 30, 2009. In conclusion, the UNSC Resolution called on both parties to “continue negotiations under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon without any preconditions and with the best intentions”. The Resolution also stated that these talks should be aimed at “reaching a fair, long lasting and mutually acceptable solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”. Thus, the legal mandate and agenda for the UN sponsored Manhasset talks remained unchanged.
Initially, there seemed to be US support for van Walsum’s opinion. After the UNSC vote, US deputy ambassador Alejandro Wolff indicated Washington preferred autonomy - albeit only as part of a mutually agreed solution. “The best way to move forward, in our view, the realistic way to move forward, is to pursue a negotiated solution resulting in true autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for the POLISARIO,” Wolff stated. The next day, the US official position was further clarified in a statement by the State Department spokesman:
According to the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum, during four sets of talks, neither side was willing to discuss the other’s proposals, leading to an impasse that does not serve the people of the Western Sahara in any way. An independent Sahrawi state is not a realistic option. In our view, some form of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic way forward to resolve this longstanding conflict.
We urge the parties to focus future discussions on a mutually-acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara. As Ambassador Wolff said following the adoption of the resolution, the United States will support these efforts by broadening our own engagement with the parties over the coming weeks and months. Morocco has presented a proposal that we believe is serious and credible.
However, despite the declared preference for the Moroccan autonomy proposal — a declared preference of the US Government from the moment the first drafts of the Moroccan proposals were shown in Washington — the US remains formally and officially committed to the status quo. The Bush White House clarified that the US would not impose, or participate in the imposition of, any negotiated solution. While the US does let its opinion be known, the US will not pressure either side into abandoning long-held positions. Nor will the US accept the introduction of any preconditions which might affect the modalities and outcome of the talks. In practical terms, the US positions means that although the US prefers to see the MWS conflict resolved through autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, the US will not intercede with the POLISARIO’s insistence on a referendum leading to independence as a precondition for any negotiated settlement. Thus, by urging both sides to move forward and break the impasse, the US is effectively asking Morocco to unilaterally abandon its own positions which the US has already endorsed.
The US double-speak position regarding MWS is not a unique. This is exactly the same US policy exercised toward Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. There the US endorsed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but also demanded that both sides commit to “painful concessions” in order to reach an agreement. As is the case with MWS, Armenia, which negotiates for the Armenian minority of Nagorno-Karabakh, insists that any agreement be preceded by a referendum on independence for the enclave. As is the case with MWS, the US is a staunch supporter of the referendum precondition. Significantly, the US does not have a fixed position regarding other separatist issues. Rather, the United States adopts contradictory positions depending on short-term expediency. For example, regarding the US long-term loyal allies, the Kurds of Iraq, the US adopted the opposite policy. There, the US insists that the Kurds’ quest for self-determination, for which the Kurds had paid with so much blood, must be realized within the framework of the Iraqi State and that no referendum on a possible independence was permissible. The reason for the US adamant position is, of course, the US dread of the collapse of the delicately-balanced administration in Baghdad. That only a few years ago the US promised the Kurds independence in return for their help against Saddam Hussein no longer matters.
Indeed, the US position did not convince the POLISARIO to amend its policies. On the contrary, a brazen POLISARIO challenged the process in its entirety. On May 4, 2008, POLISARIO announced that it would no longer work with van Walsum. An emergency jama’a of the front’s leadership issued a strong statement:
The bureau of the National Secretariat deemed the personal approach preached by Mr. Peter van Walsum, illegal, unjust and completely aligned to the thesis of the Moroccan colonial occupation whose objective is to confiscate the Saharawi people’s inalienable rights to self-determination and independence. The bureau vigorously condemns, on behalf of POLISARIO Front, this approach and considers that Mr. Walsum has lost the confidence of the Saharawi people and thus can no more play a rôle in the ongoing process to decolonise Western Sahara. ... [T]he Bureau solemnly reaffirms that POLISARIO Front will not accept today nor tomorrow to enter in a process that aims at negating the Saharawi people’s inalienable and imprescriptible rights to self-determination and independence.
In contrast, on May 6, Morocco reiterated its commitment to continue with the UN negotiations process despite the insistence on no preconditions. “Morocco is extremely satisfied, since the UN Security Council has called on all parties to engage in a substantial and deep negotiation, to be realistic and develop the sense of compromise,” stated Moroccan Foreign and Co-operation minister, Taieb Fassi Fihri. “We hope Algeria and POLISARIO will consider this call and this strong signal made by the international community, to be realistic in their approach and especially to be willing to reach a compromise.” He reiterated Rabat’s conviction that “the solution [to the MWS question] can only be political.”
* * *
The West’s “realism”, as portrayed by van Walsum, has actually little to do with commitment to a just solution to the lingering MWS conflict. The West supports Morocco’s autonomy plan because the West needs Morocco as Europe’s first line of defense against the brewing crises of Africa. Europe can no longer cope on its own with the crises in Sub-Saharan Africa; that is, with the collapse of states engendering mass illegal migration, radicalism, criminality, smuggling and support for jihadism. Hugging Africa’s western coastline, this weave of criminality and terrorism is advancing in order to cross-over into Europe, that is, unless it is stopped in Morocco. Ernst Uhrlau, the head of the German foreign intelligence agency, recently warned of the growing threat of jihadist movements based in North Africa to European security. “We are watching the activities of al-Qaida in North Africa with great concern. A handful of groups have become ensconced there, largely unobserved, and are strengthening bin Laden’s terrorist network. What is evolving there brings a completely new quality to the jihad on our doorstep.”
And it is the close cooperation between the Moroccan and European security services which constitutes Europe’s first line of defense.
Under such circumstances, the last thing Europe needs is a failed mini-state devoid of economic self-sustenance and responsible self-governance; and that is what POLISARIO state is considered almost certainly to be. Such a state would be a haven for smugglers, terrorists and organized crime of any type, just as other failed mini-states — most notably the recently independent Kosovo — have become. Sinking into sponsorship of criminality and terrorism-jihadism is a natural progression of aspirant governments of mini-states devoid of any viable sources of income and adamant of protecting themselves against public discontent.
Although POLIARIO has long presented itself as a progressive-revolutionary movement, the threat of a POLISARIO state serving as a jihadist bastion is not farfetched. French Intelligence warned in mid-April that “al-Qaida agents may be trying to recruit members of the POLISARIO, the guerilla arm of the Algerian-backed, failed independence movement of the so-called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).” Given the horrific conditions in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, especially the Tindouf area, the French warning continued, “the conditions are ripe for al-Qaida agents armed with cash and tales of a glorious global jihad”. European leaders are cognizant of the danger of a terrorist state in North Africa. “Who could believe that if tomorrow, or after tomorrow, a Taliban-type regime were established in one of your countries in North Africa, Europe and France could feel secure?” French Pres. Nicholas Sarkozy asked during his recent visit to Tunisia.
Even POLISARIO leaders are cognizant of Morocco’s importance to the defense of the West.
Reacting to Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC in a mid-April 2008 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal Europe, the POLISARIO’s Emhamed Khadad attributed the growing support for Morocco’s autonomy plan to its contribution to the defense of the West. “A critical foundation to this excruciating delay is the deference given to Morocco, which has served to entrench its illegal annexation of Western Sahara. The monarchical state has managed to cozy up to the US as a major Islamic ally on the ‘War on Terror’ and has been given plenty of distance to wage its internecine war on the Sahrawi people.”
However, Emhamed Khadad stressed that he had hopes for the precedents set by previous secessionist and separatist conflicts to ultimately determine the international position regarding the future of MWS. “The fact is that, should Morocco succeed in enforcing autonomy on the people of Western Sahara without a referendum, it will be in direct contravention of not only the UN’s own model of decolonization — as embodied in East Timor in 1999 for instance — but of basic international law as well.” The UN insistence to-date on sticking to international principles and viable precedents in formulating solutions for other crises — such as MWS — was giving Emhamed Khadad hope and confidence that ultimately the UN would go along with a negotiated procedure that takes the POLISARIO’s position into consideration at the expense of Morocco and the West’s own interests.
Emhamed Khadad’s analysis is not devoid of logic. The prevailing maneuvering of international positions and the contradictory positions regarding specific crises advocated by many Western powers, most notably the United States, is possible because of the absence of pragmatic standards and criteria for addressing the myriad of issues presented by unwarranted secessionism and failed mini-states. There are no viable international procedures for addressing legitimate quests for self-determination in pragmatic terms — that is, modalities for balancing the desires, at times emotional and impractical — of minorities with the legitimate interests of states, regions and the international community as a whole. Simply put, the legitimate quest by minorities for self-determination can be realized through autonomy within a state and not necessarily through the break-up of a state. Thus, the substantial impact which a POLISARIO state would have on the security and stability of Europe and Africa is a legitimate factor in determining the future of Moroccan Western Sahara. At the same time, the legitimate rights of the people of MWS should be guaranteed through a viable autonomy program.
Moroccan Western Sahara is not the sole, or for that matter most burning, case where existing international procedures fail to address both the wellbeing of the local population and the interests of the international community. Therefore, there is an urgent imperative to create frameworks of international law in order to provide the legal foundations for doing what is right and beneficial for both minorities and the international community. The recent spate and escalation of other secessionist and separatist conflicts — most notably the Abkhazia and South Ossetia crises in Georgia, or the sudden flare-up in Tibet and Xinjiang — demonstrate that left unattended and “frozen”, these conflicts have a tendency to return to life with vengeance to the detriment of global stability.
Moreover, the supportive coverage of the independence of East Timor and Kosovo by international media has already emboldened numerous minorities to demand independence and consider or even embark on armed struggles. There is growing pressure, then, to address these issues as a growing number of separatist causes continue to destabilize regions and countries while threatening to spark violence across regions and continents.
Even the UN’s key advisor agreed that POLISARIO’s day had come and gone, but the Secretary-General couldn’t bring himself to see the situation resolved.
The situation in MWS returned briefly to world attention between UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC in mid-April 2008 and the ensuing UNSC Resolution 1813 of April 30, 2008, which extended the MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) peacekeeping mandate by a full year instead of the usual six-monthly term, while the UN Secretary-General expressed the view that the current negotiations were unlikely to succeed.
Throughout, there emerged a widening gap between the public perception of the diplomatic process as conveyed by the media, and the reality as manifested in the letter of the legal documents as well as close examination of statements for the record of pertinent key officials. Ultimately, what seemed to be a major achievement for Moroccan diplomacy turned out to be a tentative potential for a breakthrough ONLY if properly capitalized on by official Rabat.
The Ban Ki-Moon report to the UNSC foretold trouble. Praising the repeatedly reiterated commitment of both Morocco and the Algerian-backed POLISARIO rebel movement to continue their negotiations, the report acknowledged that so far there has been no sign of any breakthrough in the dispute. “Momentum can only be maintained by trying to find a way out of the current political impasse through realism and a spirit of compromise from both parties,” Ban Ki-Moon wrote. Therefore, he added, it was imperative that the UNSC [UN Security Council] impress upon both sides that they must enter into “a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations without any preconditions”. However, the report stressed, both sides have intractable preconditions. Morocco insists on retaining Moroccan sovereignty while the POLISARIO insists on a referendum in which the population can choose between independence and Moroccan rule.
Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC concluded that the current negotiations procedures were unlikely to break the impasse and deliver a tangible solution to the MWS problem.
On April 22, 2008, in lengthy comments faxed to UNSC members, Peter van Walsum, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara, injected pragmatism and realism into the process. Van Walsum stressed the need to introduce “political reality” into the ongoing UN-sponsored negotiations process. As it was now, he stressed, the Manhasset, New York, talks process was at an impasse. “For the Frente POLISARIO, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation,” van Walsum wrote.
No amount of international mediation was going to break this deadlock. Moreover, the international community had its own vested interests in the region and conflict. Consequently, van Walsum wrote, he had “concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition”. For a viable agreement to be reached, he stressed, both sides should negotiate “on the assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of independence”. Failing to adopt realistic solution, he warned, would only aggravate the crisis in MWS. “I felt the need to reiterate this conclusion that Western Sahara independence is not a goal that can be attained,” van Walsum concluded.
Van Walsum’s memo created a stir, particularly among the POLISARIO and its supporters. Muhammad Khadad, a member of the POLISARIO leadership, called van Walsum’s remarks “ridiculous”, and vowed never to accept them. An Arab diplomat sympathetic to the POLISARIO said that van Walsum’s attempt to present his “personal view failed, because the only basis for negotiation in the future will be Mr. Ban’s official report”. Privately, however, Arab observers and diplomats concurred with van Walsum, as Mohammad el-Ashab noted in the influential Al-Hayat. “Peter van Walsum did not reveal anything new when he said that independence was ‘unrealistic’ for the disputed territory,” el-Ashab wrote.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon immediately distanced himself from Peter van Walsum’s observations. Ban Ki-Moon let it be known that he was reluctant to challenge the legal status quo. Ban Ki-Moon reiterated that his report to the UNSC urged the continuation of negotiations “without preconditions”, thus dropping van Walsum’s recommendation that the UN further a pragmatic attainable solution.
Hence, on the night of April 30, 2008, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1813, which was essentially more-of-the-same. The UNSC urged both parties to enter into “a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations” to resolve their bitter dispute. The UNSC specified that both parties should “continue with negotiations without preconditions,” and in good faith “with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution”. However, in a nod to van Walsum, the UNSC welcomed the “serious and credible Moroccan efforts” to move the negotiations process along, while only “taking note” of the POLISARIO’s proposals. At the same time, the UNSC endorsed Ban Ki-Moon’s observation that “realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations”.
UNSC Resolution 1813 also renewed the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until April 30, 2009. In conclusion, the UNSC Resolution called on both parties to “continue negotiations under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon without any preconditions and with the best intentions”. The Resolution also stated that these talks should be aimed at “reaching a fair, long lasting and mutually acceptable solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”. Thus, the legal mandate and agenda for the UN sponsored Manhasset talks remained unchanged.
Initially, there seemed to be US support for van Walsum’s opinion. After the UNSC vote, US deputy ambassador Alejandro Wolff indicated Washington preferred autonomy - albeit only as part of a mutually agreed solution. “The best way to move forward, in our view, the realistic way to move forward, is to pursue a negotiated solution resulting in true autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for the POLISARIO,” Wolff stated. The next day, the US official position was further clarified in a statement by the State Department spokesman:
According to the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum, during four sets of talks, neither side was willing to discuss the other’s proposals, leading to an impasse that does not serve the people of the Western Sahara in any way. An independent Sahrawi state is not a realistic option. In our view, some form of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic way forward to resolve this longstanding conflict.
We urge the parties to focus future discussions on a mutually-acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara. As Ambassador Wolff said following the adoption of the resolution, the United States will support these efforts by broadening our own engagement with the parties over the coming weeks and months. Morocco has presented a proposal that we believe is serious and credible.
However, despite the declared preference for the Moroccan autonomy proposal — a declared preference of the US Government from the moment the first drafts of the Moroccan proposals were shown in Washington — the US remains formally and officially committed to the status quo. The Bush White House clarified that the US would not impose, or participate in the imposition of, any negotiated solution. While the US does let its opinion be known, the US will not pressure either side into abandoning long-held positions. Nor will the US accept the introduction of any preconditions which might affect the modalities and outcome of the talks. In practical terms, the US positions means that although the US prefers to see the MWS conflict resolved through autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, the US will not intercede with the POLISARIO’s insistence on a referendum leading to independence as a precondition for any negotiated settlement. Thus, by urging both sides to move forward and break the impasse, the US is effectively asking Morocco to unilaterally abandon its own positions which the US has already endorsed.
The US double-speak position regarding MWS is not a unique. This is exactly the same US policy exercised toward Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. There the US endorsed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but also demanded that both sides commit to “painful concessions” in order to reach an agreement. As is the case with MWS, Armenia, which negotiates for the Armenian minority of Nagorno-Karabakh, insists that any agreement be preceded by a referendum on independence for the enclave. As is the case with MWS, the US is a staunch supporter of the referendum precondition. Significantly, the US does not have a fixed position regarding other separatist issues. Rather, the United States adopts contradictory positions depending on short-term expediency. For example, regarding the US long-term loyal allies, the Kurds of Iraq, the US adopted the opposite policy. There, the US insists that the Kurds’ quest for self-determination, for which the Kurds had paid with so much blood, must be realized within the framework of the Iraqi State and that no referendum on a possible independence was permissible. The reason for the US adamant position is, of course, the US dread of the collapse of the delicately-balanced administration in Baghdad. That only a few years ago the US promised the Kurds independence in return for their help against Saddam Hussein no longer matters.
Indeed, the US position did not convince the POLISARIO to amend its policies. On the contrary, a brazen POLISARIO challenged the process in its entirety. On May 4, 2008, POLISARIO announced that it would no longer work with van Walsum. An emergency jama’a of the front’s leadership issued a strong statement:
The bureau of the National Secretariat deemed the personal approach preached by Mr. Peter van Walsum, illegal, unjust and completely aligned to the thesis of the Moroccan colonial occupation whose objective is to confiscate the Saharawi people’s inalienable rights to self-determination and independence. The bureau vigorously condemns, on behalf of POLISARIO Front, this approach and considers that Mr. Walsum has lost the confidence of the Saharawi people and thus can no more play a rôle in the ongoing process to decolonise Western Sahara. ... [T]he Bureau solemnly reaffirms that POLISARIO Front will not accept today nor tomorrow to enter in a process that aims at negating the Saharawi people’s inalienable and imprescriptible rights to self-determination and independence.
In contrast, on May 6, Morocco reiterated its commitment to continue with the UN negotiations process despite the insistence on no preconditions. “Morocco is extremely satisfied, since the UN Security Council has called on all parties to engage in a substantial and deep negotiation, to be realistic and develop the sense of compromise,” stated Moroccan Foreign and Co-operation minister, Taieb Fassi Fihri. “We hope Algeria and POLISARIO will consider this call and this strong signal made by the international community, to be realistic in their approach and especially to be willing to reach a compromise.” He reiterated Rabat’s conviction that “the solution [to the MWS question] can only be political.”
* * *
The West’s “realism”, as portrayed by van Walsum, has actually little to do with commitment to a just solution to the lingering MWS conflict. The West supports Morocco’s autonomy plan because the West needs Morocco as Europe’s first line of defense against the brewing crises of Africa. Europe can no longer cope on its own with the crises in Sub-Saharan Africa; that is, with the collapse of states engendering mass illegal migration, radicalism, criminality, smuggling and support for jihadism. Hugging Africa’s western coastline, this weave of criminality and terrorism is advancing in order to cross-over into Europe, that is, unless it is stopped in Morocco. Ernst Uhrlau, the head of the German foreign intelligence agency, recently warned of the growing threat of jihadist movements based in North Africa to European security. “We are watching the activities of al-Qaida in North Africa with great concern. A handful of groups have become ensconced there, largely unobserved, and are strengthening bin Laden’s terrorist network. What is evolving there brings a completely new quality to the jihad on our doorstep.”
And it is the close cooperation between the Moroccan and European security services which constitutes Europe’s first line of defense.
Under such circumstances, the last thing Europe needs is a failed mini-state devoid of economic self-sustenance and responsible self-governance; and that is what POLISARIO state is considered almost certainly to be. Such a state would be a haven for smugglers, terrorists and organized crime of any type, just as other failed mini-states — most notably the recently independent Kosovo — have become. Sinking into sponsorship of criminality and terrorism-jihadism is a natural progression of aspirant governments of mini-states devoid of any viable sources of income and adamant of protecting themselves against public discontent.
Although POLIARIO has long presented itself as a progressive-revolutionary movement, the threat of a POLISARIO state serving as a jihadist bastion is not farfetched. French Intelligence warned in mid-April that “al-Qaida agents may be trying to recruit members of the POLISARIO, the guerilla arm of the Algerian-backed, failed independence movement of the so-called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).” Given the horrific conditions in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, especially the Tindouf area, the French warning continued, “the conditions are ripe for al-Qaida agents armed with cash and tales of a glorious global jihad”. European leaders are cognizant of the danger of a terrorist state in North Africa. “Who could believe that if tomorrow, or after tomorrow, a Taliban-type regime were established in one of your countries in North Africa, Europe and France could feel secure?” French Pres. Nicholas Sarkozy asked during his recent visit to Tunisia.
Even POLISARIO leaders are cognizant of Morocco’s importance to the defense of the West.
Reacting to Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC in a mid-April 2008 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal Europe, the POLISARIO’s Emhamed Khadad attributed the growing support for Morocco’s autonomy plan to its contribution to the defense of the West. “A critical foundation to this excruciating delay is the deference given to Morocco, which has served to entrench its illegal annexation of Western Sahara. The monarchical state has managed to cozy up to the US as a major Islamic ally on the ‘War on Terror’ and has been given plenty of distance to wage its internecine war on the Sahrawi people.”
However, Emhamed Khadad stressed that he had hopes for the precedents set by previous secessionist and separatist conflicts to ultimately determine the international position regarding the future of MWS. “The fact is that, should Morocco succeed in enforcing autonomy on the people of Western Sahara without a referendum, it will be in direct contravention of not only the UN’s own model of decolonization — as embodied in East Timor in 1999 for instance — but of basic international law as well.” The UN insistence to-date on sticking to international principles and viable precedents in formulating solutions for other crises — such as MWS — was giving Emhamed Khadad hope and confidence that ultimately the UN would go along with a negotiated procedure that takes the POLISARIO’s position into consideration at the expense of Morocco and the West’s own interests.
Emhamed Khadad’s analysis is not devoid of logic. The prevailing maneuvering of international positions and the contradictory positions regarding specific crises advocated by many Western powers, most notably the United States, is possible because of the absence of pragmatic standards and criteria for addressing the myriad of issues presented by unwarranted secessionism and failed mini-states. There are no viable international procedures for addressing legitimate quests for self-determination in pragmatic terms — that is, modalities for balancing the desires, at times emotional and impractical — of minorities with the legitimate interests of states, regions and the international community as a whole. Simply put, the legitimate quest by minorities for self-determination can be realized through autonomy within a state and not necessarily through the break-up of a state. Thus, the substantial impact which a POLISARIO state would have on the security and stability of Europe and Africa is a legitimate factor in determining the future of Moroccan Western Sahara. At the same time, the legitimate rights of the people of MWS should be guaranteed through a viable autonomy program.
Moroccan Western Sahara is not the sole, or for that matter most burning, case where existing international procedures fail to address both the wellbeing of the local population and the interests of the international community. Therefore, there is an urgent imperative to create frameworks of international law in order to provide the legal foundations for doing what is right and beneficial for both minorities and the international community. The recent spate and escalation of other secessionist and separatist conflicts — most notably the Abkhazia and South Ossetia crises in Georgia, or the sudden flare-up in Tibet and Xinjiang — demonstrate that left unattended and “frozen”, these conflicts have a tendency to return to life with vengeance to the detriment of global stability.
Moreover, the supportive coverage of the independence of East Timor and Kosovo by international media has already emboldened numerous minorities to demand independence and consider or even embark on armed struggles. There is growing pressure, then, to address these issues as a growing number of separatist causes continue to destabilize regions and countries while threatening to spark violence across regions and continents.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Algeria Threatening Maghreb, Euro-Med Trading Region: Report
Med-Atlantic has received a copy of a report by a Washington-based intelligence service, Global Information System (GIS), which says that Algeria’s defense moves, including its ambitious military procurement program, is not only de-stabilizing the Maghreb, but also jeopardizing the emerging Mediterranean trading region which links Europe into the North African market.
The full report of 26 March 2008, is as follows:
Maghreb Balance Becomes More Delicate, But the Challenges to the “Greater European” Trading Arena, and Western Interests, Become More Clear
The rejection by the Algerian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Jaza’eriya/Armée de l'air algérienne) of its order for 36 MiG-29 combat aircraft (29 single-seat MiG-29SMT Fulcrum fighters and six two-seat MiG-29UB) after the delivery of initial batches of the type through 2007 might seem at first to indicate that Algeria was likely to delay its acquisition of some of its advanced combat capability, allowing neighboring Morocco a chance of at least a brief window of parity when it acquires its proposed 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 50+ fighters.
The Algerian decision to reject the 15 MiG-29SMTs already delivered, on quality grounds originally raised by Belorussian technicians, however, holds the seeds of making the Algerian Air Force even more advanced than other states in the region. Indeed, it places Algeria in the position of being a strategically significant force in the Mediterranean, and one which is again following its 20th Century tradition of alliance with Russia. This once again makes the Mediterranean a region of interesting strategic maneuver as the world moves back to a period of a new Cold War structuring, albeit a new Cold War based on factors other than ideology.
The significance of the Algerian move from a MiG-29SMT-based air combat capability is that it seems likely now to be replaced by MiG-35 capability, albeit at a later date and a slower pace of delivery. It has been suggested by Moscow that the unsatisfactory MiG-29SMTs could be ultimately replaced by significantly superior MiG-29M2s or MiG-35s.
On January 26, 2006, it was announced that Russia would sell $4-billion worth of new arms to Algeria (Iranian sources said that the deal was actually worth $7.5-billion), in a deal which would include 36 MiG-29SMT and 28 Su-30 combat aircraft, eight divisions of Almaz-Antei S-300MPU2 Favorit air defense systems, as well as a quantity of T-90 battle tanks and supporting combat vehicles and artillery pieces. Under the deal, Russia was to sign additional contracts for the upgrade of Soviet-made arms already in Algerian service. The contracts had been ratified and were expected to be signed during Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin’s visit to Algeria in late February or March 2006. The systems would be paid for in a complex scheme involving striking off part of Algeria’s Soviet debt. As well, Algeria was believed to have indicated that it would buy up to 50 Yak-130 advanced training aircraft and about 30 Tunguska-M1 air defense systems.
Some $1.28-billion of the deal was for the MiG-29s. However, in October 2007, Algeria stopped payments on other military contracts in the package pending the return of the MiGs. As noted, Russia moved quickly to remedy the situation by offering more advanced, and truly new, aircraft, even though this will clearly involve some time-lag in deliveries.
In buying the supposedly new MiG-29SMT fighters from Russia, Algeria was paying off its debt to the former USSR. As part of the payment, Russia offered to take back 36 old MiGs which had been bought by Algeria from Ukraine and Belarus, and flown by the Algerian Air Force. The “new” MiG-29SMTs, however, were understood to be refurbished Soviet-era airframes, not built to the same quality levels of current-generation MiG-29s. It may have been that only by using existing, stockpiled airframes that Russia could have met the Algerian delivery schedule which had the “new” aircraft in Algerian Air Force hands within about a year.
The US Government, meanwhile, worked hard to pressure neighboring Morocco away from its purchase of 18 to 24 AMD Rafale fourth-generation combat aircraft from France, despite the fact that the Rafale — more capable in air combat than the F-16C — would have been a far more effective deterrent against any Algerian adventurism with its MiGs and Sukhois. Moreover, despite the price differential in the Rafale over the F-16, it was likely that Saudi Arabia would have helped supplement the Moroccan budget to buy the Rafale. It can only be assumed that the US advised Saudi Arabia against such an action, so that Lockheed Martin would be able to continue its F-16 production line until the F-35 was in series production. Moreover, although Morocco is a major non-NATO ally of the US and has contributed a lot to the so-called “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), the Bush Administration insists that Rabat pays for the F-16s in full rather than offer them as a US military aid program.
The strategic balance in the south-western Mediterranean is of critical importance globally because it determines the stability of the Strait of Gibraltar and all of Europe’s southern flank. But while most Western analysts feel that the southern Mediterranean — or Maghrebi — balance is only of academic interest, given the belief that there is no long-term desire or interest on the part of any state there to confront Western or European interests, the reality is that stability in the region is likely to be undermined progressively if Algeria achieves its anticipated military dominance of the area.
Indeed, the ability of the Maghreb to influence stability in southern Europe — as evidenced by the actions of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi during the Cold War — has been forgotten, and the prospect of a stable, advanced, and economically integrated Maghreb as part of the European economy is too little discussed. And that is quite apart from Russia attempting to use its traditional links to the area to secure at least some leverage vis-à-vis Western Europe for the future. Gazprom’s growing involvement in the Algerian natural gas industry will increase the Russian influence over the European energy market.
The problem is not specifically that Algeria would deliberately work against European or Western interests, but, rather, the reality that it is structurally preoccupied with its own internal problems and with its historical pursuit of geographic expansion. Indeed, much of its recent defense modernization purchases — the January 2006 package of arms purchases from Russia — is about ensuring Algeria’s ability to intimidate Morocco over the question of the future of Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS). The future of MWS is an immediate issue challenging Algeria and Morocco, and while Morocco has prevailed legally in asserting its historical claims to the Sahara following a fairly brief period of Spanish colonial occupation of the area, Algeria has succeeded in staving off full acceptance by the international community of Morocco’s position.
The growth of Algeria’s military position, designed to ultimately give Algeria dominance over an “independent” MWS so that Algeria could have direct access to the Atlantic, among other things, will force Morocco into developing other regional alliances. The US has not proven a reliable ally; it has served to reinforce Algeria’s claims to the WMS at least to the extent that it has ‘brokered’ international negotiations which have essentially overridden the legal ownership by Morocco of MWS as confirmed by the World Court. And France cannot commit totally to Morocco, given the reality that it has historically regarded Algeria as its most important ally in the Maghreb. So Morocco would be forced to seek broader and more complex solutions, as it has done in the past.
These include the fact that Morocco has prevailed in the Muslim world on the matter: not one Arab League state recognizes the Algerian front organization, POLISARIO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro), as the legitimate controlling power of Western Sahara. And Morocco has progressively reduced the number of African Union (AU) states which recognize Western Sahara as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
But Morocco will need to do more to counterbalance Algerian military growth, and this will include supporting the viability of Libya as a regional power. This holds some dangers for as long as Libya is in the hands of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, despite the “brother Colonel’s” failing health. Despite the relatively static situation in Libya, because of Col. Qadhafi’s relative quiescence of late, the deal struck between France and Libya in December 2007 is fairly positive for Morocco and cautionary for Algeria.
That deal reportedly included the Libyan purchase of 35 Eurocopter military helicopters, including 10 Tiger attack, 15 EC725 Caracal multi-mission utility, 10 AS550 Fennec liaison/training helicopters; César 155mm truck-mounted SP howitzers; 60 VAB wheeled armored vehicles; 13 Sagaie wheeled armored vehicles; 25 VBL armored scout/liaison vehicles; eight fast patrol boats; air-defense radars; and the modernization of 12+ AMD Mirage F-1C combat aircraft in the Libyan Air Force inventory.
Clearly, neither the Moroccan nor the Libyan purchases cause Algeria too much concern at this point, but the reality is that Algeria — given its commitment to Russia for historical and debt-reduction reasons — has little with which to bargain with Paris or the US. Logically, then, Algiers will begin to step up its diplomacy in Paris and Washington over the coming year, largely to balance out the fact that it had appeared to have given all its support to Russia. Algeria may even throw some orders — for civilian or military capital goods — the way of France or the US. Indeed, France already offered to sell the Rafale fighter to Algeria, and it was only rejected in favor of the Russian deal on the grounds of costs and the ability to reduce old Algerian debt to the USSR (debt which was assumed as payable, post-Soviet, to Russia).
Thus the diplomatic battle between Algeria and Morocco will gain momentum in Europe and the US, largely to seek or deny incremental movements in the United Nations-sponsored talks on the Moroccan Western Sahara. What will be of significance, then, is whether the Europeans or the US will take the broader view of their interests in how the Maghreb maneuvering evolves. Or whether, as in the past, they will allow the Sahara dispute to continue to be “created” by Algeria as part of the ongoing Algerian expansion.
The full report of 26 March 2008, is as follows:
Maghreb Balance Becomes More Delicate, But the Challenges to the “Greater European” Trading Arena, and Western Interests, Become More Clear
The rejection by the Algerian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Jaza’eriya/Armée de l'air algérienne) of its order for 36 MiG-29 combat aircraft (29 single-seat MiG-29SMT Fulcrum fighters and six two-seat MiG-29UB) after the delivery of initial batches of the type through 2007 might seem at first to indicate that Algeria was likely to delay its acquisition of some of its advanced combat capability, allowing neighboring Morocco a chance of at least a brief window of parity when it acquires its proposed 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 50+ fighters.
The Algerian decision to reject the 15 MiG-29SMTs already delivered, on quality grounds originally raised by Belorussian technicians, however, holds the seeds of making the Algerian Air Force even more advanced than other states in the region. Indeed, it places Algeria in the position of being a strategically significant force in the Mediterranean, and one which is again following its 20th Century tradition of alliance with Russia. This once again makes the Mediterranean a region of interesting strategic maneuver as the world moves back to a period of a new Cold War structuring, albeit a new Cold War based on factors other than ideology.
The significance of the Algerian move from a MiG-29SMT-based air combat capability is that it seems likely now to be replaced by MiG-35 capability, albeit at a later date and a slower pace of delivery. It has been suggested by Moscow that the unsatisfactory MiG-29SMTs could be ultimately replaced by significantly superior MiG-29M2s or MiG-35s.
On January 26, 2006, it was announced that Russia would sell $4-billion worth of new arms to Algeria (Iranian sources said that the deal was actually worth $7.5-billion), in a deal which would include 36 MiG-29SMT and 28 Su-30 combat aircraft, eight divisions of Almaz-Antei S-300MPU2 Favorit air defense systems, as well as a quantity of T-90 battle tanks and supporting combat vehicles and artillery pieces. Under the deal, Russia was to sign additional contracts for the upgrade of Soviet-made arms already in Algerian service. The contracts had been ratified and were expected to be signed during Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin’s visit to Algeria in late February or March 2006. The systems would be paid for in a complex scheme involving striking off part of Algeria’s Soviet debt. As well, Algeria was believed to have indicated that it would buy up to 50 Yak-130 advanced training aircraft and about 30 Tunguska-M1 air defense systems.
Some $1.28-billion of the deal was for the MiG-29s. However, in October 2007, Algeria stopped payments on other military contracts in the package pending the return of the MiGs. As noted, Russia moved quickly to remedy the situation by offering more advanced, and truly new, aircraft, even though this will clearly involve some time-lag in deliveries.
In buying the supposedly new MiG-29SMT fighters from Russia, Algeria was paying off its debt to the former USSR. As part of the payment, Russia offered to take back 36 old MiGs which had been bought by Algeria from Ukraine and Belarus, and flown by the Algerian Air Force. The “new” MiG-29SMTs, however, were understood to be refurbished Soviet-era airframes, not built to the same quality levels of current-generation MiG-29s. It may have been that only by using existing, stockpiled airframes that Russia could have met the Algerian delivery schedule which had the “new” aircraft in Algerian Air Force hands within about a year.
The US Government, meanwhile, worked hard to pressure neighboring Morocco away from its purchase of 18 to 24 AMD Rafale fourth-generation combat aircraft from France, despite the fact that the Rafale — more capable in air combat than the F-16C — would have been a far more effective deterrent against any Algerian adventurism with its MiGs and Sukhois. Moreover, despite the price differential in the Rafale over the F-16, it was likely that Saudi Arabia would have helped supplement the Moroccan budget to buy the Rafale. It can only be assumed that the US advised Saudi Arabia against such an action, so that Lockheed Martin would be able to continue its F-16 production line until the F-35 was in series production. Moreover, although Morocco is a major non-NATO ally of the US and has contributed a lot to the so-called “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), the Bush Administration insists that Rabat pays for the F-16s in full rather than offer them as a US military aid program.
The strategic balance in the south-western Mediterranean is of critical importance globally because it determines the stability of the Strait of Gibraltar and all of Europe’s southern flank. But while most Western analysts feel that the southern Mediterranean — or Maghrebi — balance is only of academic interest, given the belief that there is no long-term desire or interest on the part of any state there to confront Western or European interests, the reality is that stability in the region is likely to be undermined progressively if Algeria achieves its anticipated military dominance of the area.
Indeed, the ability of the Maghreb to influence stability in southern Europe — as evidenced by the actions of Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi during the Cold War — has been forgotten, and the prospect of a stable, advanced, and economically integrated Maghreb as part of the European economy is too little discussed. And that is quite apart from Russia attempting to use its traditional links to the area to secure at least some leverage vis-à-vis Western Europe for the future. Gazprom’s growing involvement in the Algerian natural gas industry will increase the Russian influence over the European energy market.
The problem is not specifically that Algeria would deliberately work against European or Western interests, but, rather, the reality that it is structurally preoccupied with its own internal problems and with its historical pursuit of geographic expansion. Indeed, much of its recent defense modernization purchases — the January 2006 package of arms purchases from Russia — is about ensuring Algeria’s ability to intimidate Morocco over the question of the future of Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS). The future of MWS is an immediate issue challenging Algeria and Morocco, and while Morocco has prevailed legally in asserting its historical claims to the Sahara following a fairly brief period of Spanish colonial occupation of the area, Algeria has succeeded in staving off full acceptance by the international community of Morocco’s position.
The growth of Algeria’s military position, designed to ultimately give Algeria dominance over an “independent” MWS so that Algeria could have direct access to the Atlantic, among other things, will force Morocco into developing other regional alliances. The US has not proven a reliable ally; it has served to reinforce Algeria’s claims to the WMS at least to the extent that it has ‘brokered’ international negotiations which have essentially overridden the legal ownership by Morocco of MWS as confirmed by the World Court. And France cannot commit totally to Morocco, given the reality that it has historically regarded Algeria as its most important ally in the Maghreb. So Morocco would be forced to seek broader and more complex solutions, as it has done in the past.
These include the fact that Morocco has prevailed in the Muslim world on the matter: not one Arab League state recognizes the Algerian front organization, POLISARIO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro), as the legitimate controlling power of Western Sahara. And Morocco has progressively reduced the number of African Union (AU) states which recognize Western Sahara as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
But Morocco will need to do more to counterbalance Algerian military growth, and this will include supporting the viability of Libya as a regional power. This holds some dangers for as long as Libya is in the hands of Col. Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, despite the “brother Colonel’s” failing health. Despite the relatively static situation in Libya, because of Col. Qadhafi’s relative quiescence of late, the deal struck between France and Libya in December 2007 is fairly positive for Morocco and cautionary for Algeria.
That deal reportedly included the Libyan purchase of 35 Eurocopter military helicopters, including 10 Tiger attack, 15 EC725 Caracal multi-mission utility, 10 AS550 Fennec liaison/training helicopters; César 155mm truck-mounted SP howitzers; 60 VAB wheeled armored vehicles; 13 Sagaie wheeled armored vehicles; 25 VBL armored scout/liaison vehicles; eight fast patrol boats; air-defense radars; and the modernization of 12+ AMD Mirage F-1C combat aircraft in the Libyan Air Force inventory.
Clearly, neither the Moroccan nor the Libyan purchases cause Algeria too much concern at this point, but the reality is that Algeria — given its commitment to Russia for historical and debt-reduction reasons — has little with which to bargain with Paris or the US. Logically, then, Algiers will begin to step up its diplomacy in Paris and Washington over the coming year, largely to balance out the fact that it had appeared to have given all its support to Russia. Algeria may even throw some orders — for civilian or military capital goods — the way of France or the US. Indeed, France already offered to sell the Rafale fighter to Algeria, and it was only rejected in favor of the Russian deal on the grounds of costs and the ability to reduce old Algerian debt to the USSR (debt which was assumed as payable, post-Soviet, to Russia).
Thus the diplomatic battle between Algeria and Morocco will gain momentum in Europe and the US, largely to seek or deny incremental movements in the United Nations-sponsored talks on the Moroccan Western Sahara. What will be of significance, then, is whether the Europeans or the US will take the broader view of their interests in how the Maghreb maneuvering evolves. Or whether, as in the past, they will allow the Sahara dispute to continue to be “created” by Algeria as part of the ongoing Algerian expansion.
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