UN SecGen Defies Own Advisor to Keep POLISARIO in the Game

What is the United Nations Secretary-General doing? The legalities of the Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS) situation have long been settled. Algeria-backed POLISARIO has been discredited and has been losing support from all but the dedicated leftist international movements who see it as “revolutionary”, and the population of WMS was happy to be part of the increasingly prosperous Moroccan polity.

Even the UN’s key advisor agreed that POLISARIO’s day had come and gone, but the Secretary-General couldn’t bring himself to see the situation resolved.

The situation in MWS returned briefly to world attention between UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC in mid-April 2008 and the ensuing UNSC Resolution 1813 of April 30, 2008, which extended the MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) peacekeeping mandate by a full year instead of the usual six-monthly term, while the UN Secretary-General expressed the view that the current negotiations were unlikely to succeed.

Throughout, there emerged a widening gap between the public perception of the diplomatic process as conveyed by the media, and the reality as manifested in the letter of the legal documents as well as close examination of statements for the record of pertinent key officials. Ultimately, what seemed to be a major achievement for Moroccan diplomacy turned out to be a tentative potential for a breakthrough ONLY if properly capitalized on by official Rabat.

The Ban Ki-Moon report to the UNSC foretold trouble. Praising the repeatedly reiterated commitment of both Morocco and the Algerian-backed POLISARIO rebel movement to continue their negotiations, the report acknowledged that so far there has been no sign of any breakthrough in the dispute. “Momentum can only be maintained by trying to find a way out of the current political impasse through realism and a spirit of compromise from both parties,” Ban Ki-Moon wrote. Therefore, he added, it was imperative that the UNSC [UN Security Council] impress upon both sides that they must enter into “a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations without any preconditions”. However, the report stressed, both sides have intractable preconditions. Morocco insists on retaining Moroccan sovereignty while the POLISARIO insists on a referendum in which the population can choose between independence and Moroccan rule.

Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC concluded that the current negotiations procedures were unlikely to break the impasse and deliver a tangible solution to the MWS problem.

On April 22, 2008, in lengthy comments faxed to UNSC members, Peter van Walsum, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General for Western Sahara, injected pragmatism and realism into the process. Van Walsum stressed the need to introduce “political reality” into the ongoing UN-sponsored negotiations process. As it was now, he stressed, the Manhasset, New York, talks process was at an impasse. “For the Frente POLISARIO, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation,” van Walsum wrote.

No amount of international mediation was going to break this deadlock. Moreover, the international community had its own vested interests in the region and conflict. Consequently, van Walsum wrote, he had “concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition”. For a viable agreement to be reached, he stressed, both sides should negotiate “on the assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of independence”. Failing to adopt realistic solution, he warned, would only aggravate the crisis in MWS. “I felt the need to reiterate this conclusion that Western Sahara independence is not a goal that can be attained,” van Walsum concluded.

Van Walsum’s memo created a stir, particularly among the POLISARIO and its supporters. Muhammad Khadad, a member of the POLISARIO leadership, called van Walsum’s remarks “ridiculous”, and vowed never to accept them. An Arab diplomat sympathetic to the POLISARIO said that van Walsum’s attempt to present his “personal view failed, because the only basis for negotiation in the future will be Mr. Ban’s official report”. Privately, however, Arab observers and diplomats concurred with van Walsum, as Mohammad el-Ashab noted in the influential Al-Hayat. “Peter van Walsum did not reveal anything new when he said that independence was ‘unrealistic’ for the disputed territory,” el-Ashab wrote.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon immediately distanced himself from Peter van Walsum’s observations. Ban Ki-Moon let it be known that he was reluctant to challenge the legal status quo. Ban Ki-Moon reiterated that his report to the UNSC urged the continuation of negotiations “without preconditions”, thus dropping van Walsum’s recommendation that the UN further a pragmatic attainable solution.

Hence, on the night of April 30, 2008, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1813, which was essentially more-of-the-same. The UNSC urged both parties to enter into “a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations” to resolve their bitter dispute. The UNSC specified that both parties should “continue with negotiations without preconditions,” and in good faith “with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution”. However, in a nod to van Walsum, the UNSC welcomed the “serious and credible Moroccan efforts” to move the negotiations process along, while only “taking note” of the POLISARIO’s proposals. At the same time, the UNSC endorsed Ban Ki-Moon’s observation that “realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations”.

UNSC Resolution 1813 also renewed the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until April 30, 2009. In conclusion, the UNSC Resolution called on both parties to “continue negotiations under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon without any preconditions and with the best intentions”. The Resolution also stated that these talks should be aimed at “reaching a fair, long lasting and mutually acceptable solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”. Thus, the legal mandate and agenda for the UN sponsored Manhasset talks remained unchanged.

Initially, there seemed to be US support for van Walsum’s opinion. After the UNSC vote, US deputy ambassador Alejandro Wolff indicated Washington preferred autonomy - albeit only as part of a mutually agreed solution. “The best way to move forward, in our view, the realistic way to move forward, is to pursue a negotiated solution resulting in true autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for the POLISARIO,” Wolff stated. The next day, the US official position was further clarified in a statement by the State Department spokesman:

According to the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum, during four sets of talks, neither side was willing to discuss the other’s proposals, leading to an impasse that does not serve the people of the Western Sahara in any way. An independent Sahrawi state is not a realistic option. In our view, some form of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic way forward to resolve this longstanding conflict.

We urge the parties to focus future discussions on a mutually-acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara. As Ambassador Wolff said following the adoption of the resolution, the United States will support these efforts by broadening our own engagement with the parties over the coming weeks and months. Morocco has presented a proposal that we believe is serious and credible.

However, despite the declared preference for the Moroccan autonomy proposal — a declared preference of the US Government from the moment the first drafts of the Moroccan proposals were shown in Washington — the US remains formally and officially committed to the status quo. The Bush White House clarified that the US would not impose, or participate in the imposition of, any negotiated solution. While the US does let its opinion be known, the US will not pressure either side into abandoning long-held positions. Nor will the US accept the introduction of any preconditions which might affect the modalities and outcome of the talks. In practical terms, the US positions means that although the US prefers to see the MWS conflict resolved through autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, the US will not intercede with the POLISARIO’s insistence on a referendum leading to independence as a precondition for any negotiated settlement. Thus, by urging both sides to move forward and break the impasse, the US is effectively asking Morocco to unilaterally abandon its own positions which the US has already endorsed.

The US double-speak position regarding MWS is not a unique. This is exactly the same US policy exercised toward Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. There the US endorsed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but also demanded that both sides commit to “painful concessions” in order to reach an agreement. As is the case with MWS, Armenia, which negotiates for the Armenian minority of Nagorno-Karabakh, insists that any agreement be preceded by a referendum on independence for the enclave. As is the case with MWS, the US is a staunch supporter of the referendum precondition. Significantly, the US does not have a fixed position regarding other separatist issues. Rather, the United States adopts contradictory positions depending on short-term expediency. For example, regarding the US long-term loyal allies, the Kurds of Iraq, the US adopted the opposite policy. There, the US insists that the Kurds’ quest for self-determination, for which the Kurds had paid with so much blood, must be realized within the framework of the Iraqi State and that no referendum on a possible independence was permissible. The reason for the US adamant position is, of course, the US dread of the collapse of the delicately-balanced administration in Baghdad. That only a few years ago the US promised the Kurds independence in return for their help against Saddam Hussein no longer matters.

Indeed, the US position did not convince the POLISARIO to amend its policies. On the contrary, a brazen POLISARIO challenged the process in its entirety. On May 4, 2008, POLISARIO announced that it would no longer work with van Walsum. An emergency jama’a of the front’s leadership issued a strong statement:

The bureau of the National Secretariat deemed the personal approach preached by Mr. Peter van Walsum, illegal, unjust and completely aligned to the thesis of the Moroccan colonial occupation whose objective is to confiscate the Saharawi people’s inalienable rights to self-determination and independence. The bureau vigorously condemns, on behalf of POLISARIO Front, this approach and considers that Mr. Walsum has lost the confidence of the Saharawi people and thus can no more play a rôle in the ongoing process to decolonise Western Sahara. ... [T]he Bureau solemnly reaffirms that POLISARIO Front will not accept today nor tomorrow to enter in a process that aims at negating the Saharawi people’s inalienable and imprescriptible rights to self-determination and independence.

In contrast, on May 6, Morocco reiterated its commitment to continue with the UN negotiations process despite the insistence on no preconditions. “Morocco is extremely satisfied, since the UN Security Council has called on all parties to engage in a substantial and deep negotiation, to be realistic and develop the sense of compromise,” stated Moroccan Foreign and Co-operation minister, Taieb Fassi Fihri. “We hope Algeria and POLISARIO will consider this call and this strong signal made by the international community, to be realistic in their approach and especially to be willing to reach a compromise.” He reiterated Rabat’s conviction that “the solution [to the MWS question] can only be political.”

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The West’s “realism”, as portrayed by van Walsum, has actually little to do with commitment to a just solution to the lingering MWS conflict. The West supports Morocco’s autonomy plan because the West needs Morocco as Europe’s first line of defense against the brewing crises of Africa. Europe can no longer cope on its own with the crises in Sub-Saharan Africa; that is, with the collapse of states engendering mass illegal migration, radicalism, criminality, smuggling and support for jihadism. Hugging Africa’s western coastline, this weave of criminality and terrorism is advancing in order to cross-over into Europe, that is, unless it is stopped in Morocco. Ernst Uhrlau, the head of the German foreign intelligence agency, recently warned of the growing threat of jihadist movements based in North Africa to European security. “We are watching the activities of al-Qaida in North Africa with great concern. A handful of groups have become ensconced there, largely unobserved, and are strengthening bin Laden’s terrorist network. What is evolving there brings a completely new quality to the jihad on our doorstep.”

And it is the close cooperation between the Moroccan and European security services which constitutes Europe’s first line of defense.

Under such circumstances, the last thing Europe needs is a failed mini-state devoid of economic self-sustenance and responsible self-governance; and that is what POLISARIO state is considered almost certainly to be. Such a state would be a haven for smugglers, terrorists and organized crime of any type, just as other failed mini-states — most notably the recently independent Kosovo — have become. Sinking into sponsorship of criminality and terrorism-jihadism is a natural progression of aspirant governments of mini-states devoid of any viable sources of income and adamant of protecting themselves against public discontent.

Although POLIARIO has long presented itself as a progressive-revolutionary movement, the threat of a POLISARIO state serving as a jihadist bastion is not farfetched. French Intelligence warned in mid-April that “al-Qaida agents may be trying to recruit members of the POLISARIO, the guerilla arm of the Algerian-backed, failed independence movement of the so-called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).” Given the horrific conditions in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, especially the Tindouf area, the French warning continued, “the conditions are ripe for al-Qaida agents armed with cash and tales of a glorious global jihad”. European leaders are cognizant of the danger of a terrorist state in North Africa. “Who could believe that if tomorrow, or after tomorrow, a Taliban-type regime were established in one of your countries in North Africa, Europe and France could feel secure?” French Pres. Nicholas Sarkozy asked during his recent visit to Tunisia.

Even POLISARIO leaders are cognizant of Morocco’s importance to the defense of the West.

Reacting to Ban Ki-Moon’s report to the UNSC in a mid-April 2008 op-ed in The Wall Street Journal Europe, the POLISARIO’s Emhamed Khadad attributed the growing support for Morocco’s autonomy plan to its contribution to the defense of the West. “A critical foundation to this excruciating delay is the deference given to Morocco, which has served to entrench its illegal annexation of Western Sahara. The monarchical state has managed to cozy up to the US as a major Islamic ally on the ‘War on Terror’ and has been given plenty of distance to wage its internecine war on the Sahrawi people.”

However, Emhamed Khadad stressed that he had hopes for the precedents set by previous secessionist and separatist conflicts to ultimately determine the international position regarding the future of MWS. “The fact is that, should Morocco succeed in enforcing autonomy on the people of Western Sahara without a referendum, it will be in direct contravention of not only the UN’s own model of decolonization — as embodied in East Timor in 1999 for instance — but of basic international law as well.” The UN insistence to-date on sticking to international principles and viable precedents in formulating solutions for other crises — such as MWS — was giving Emhamed Khadad hope and confidence that ultimately the UN would go along with a negotiated procedure that takes the POLISARIO’s position into consideration at the expense of Morocco and the West’s own interests.

Emhamed Khadad’s analysis is not devoid of logic. The prevailing maneuvering of international positions and the contradictory positions regarding specific crises advocated by many Western powers, most notably the United States, is possible because of the absence of pragmatic standards and criteria for addressing the myriad of issues presented by unwarranted secessionism and failed mini-states. There are no viable international procedures for addressing legitimate quests for self-determination in pragmatic terms — that is, modalities for balancing the desires, at times emotional and impractical — of minorities with the legitimate interests of states, regions and the international community as a whole. Simply put, the legitimate quest by minorities for self-determination can be realized through autonomy within a state and not necessarily through the break-up of a state. Thus, the substantial impact which a POLISARIO state would have on the security and stability of Europe and Africa is a legitimate factor in determining the future of Moroccan Western Sahara. At the same time, the legitimate rights of the people of MWS should be guaranteed through a viable autonomy program.

Moroccan Western Sahara is not the sole, or for that matter most burning, case where existing international procedures fail to address both the wellbeing of the local population and the interests of the international community. Therefore, there is an urgent imperative to create frameworks of international law in order to provide the legal foundations for doing what is right and beneficial for both minorities and the international community. The recent spate and escalation of other secessionist and separatist conflicts — most notably the Abkhazia and South Ossetia crises in Georgia, or the sudden flare-up in Tibet and Xinjiang — demonstrate that left unattended and “frozen”, these conflicts have a tendency to return to life with vengeance to the detriment of global stability.

Moreover, the supportive coverage of the independence of East Timor and Kosovo by international media has already emboldened numerous minorities to demand independence and consider or even embark on armed struggles. There is growing pressure, then, to address these issues as a growing number of separatist causes continue to destabilize regions and countries while threatening to spark violence across regions and continents.