Algeria, in the midst of its own internal power struggle, seems determined to thwart Morocco's growing diplomatic success in ending the Algerian-sponsored attempt to pry Moroccan Sahara away from the Kingdom. The Algerian leadership has clearly taken a very deliberate move to revive its proxy war against Morocco, using POLISARIO as its principal front.
Med-Atlantic received a leaked report from the Global Information System (GIS), an intelligence service used by the US Defense Department and other key Western governments, which details Algeria's plans for POLISARIO. We're running it in full here:
POLISARIO Congress Reflects the Major Threat to Maghreb Stability as Algeria Enters a Power Struggle, With Itself and the West
By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS. The great threat to stability in the Maghreb and the Western Mediterranean is not the ascent and spread of the Islamist-jihadist trend — which is extremely dangerous in the mid- to long-term — but is shaping up to be the rejuvenation of the terrorism campaign by the Frente POLISARIO (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro).
POLISARIO is currently holding its special 12th congress in Tifariti, Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS), east of the berm. Because of the regional strategic dynamics, the calls for, and threats of, the resumption of the “armed struggle” against Morocco emanating from this POLISARIO congress may prove a greater destabilizing factor for the entire Maghreb than even the most recent jihadist bombing in Algiers.
The Tifariti congress convenes at trying times for POLISARIO and the whole “Western Sahara” cause.
More than 15 years after the latest ceasefire agreement in MWS, the entire population — both in Morocco and in the POLISARIO-run camps — has demonstrated a strong commitment to a return to stability, normalcy, and chance at the betterment of their own lives. The population of MWS has indicated, through elections and other indicators, a measurable determination to remain an integral part of the Moroccan rejuvenation and development. The MWS population has been passing this message for several years to the POLSARIO leadership via their expatriate kin in Western Europe. In contrast, the refugee population in the POLISARIO camps, mainly in the Tindouf area in Algeria, is exhausted from the closure, hardship, lack of prospects. The people see no hope for themselves in an Algeria torn by civil war and afflicted by economic misery.
The much-vaunted United Nations (UN) negotiations on the future of the MWS — while not inspiring any grassroots optimism as far as the UN delivering any solution for the crisis — did rekindle a grassroots yearning for a solution. The mere international discussion during much of 2007 of the imperative to solve the MWS crisis once and for good created an indigenous grassroots desire to return to normalcy and socio-economic development even if at the expense of utopian political solutions. And under these circumstances, the social and economic ascent of Morocco has stood in sharp contrast with the abysmal conditions in the Tindouf camps, let alone Algeria as a whole. Simply put, the people of MWS realized that their own aspirations can be best achieved when they are part of Morocco.
The Moroccan elections of early September 2007 provided an uncontroversial proof of this transformation of the people of MWS. In a sharp contrast with the low voter turnout in the urban centers of northern Morocco (national average was 37 percent, and 30 percent in the urban areas), the voter turnout in the MWS was extremely heavy, and particularly in the cities (Dakhla 62 percent; Smara 58 percent, El Aaiún 50 percent). This constitutes a clear demonstration that the population in MWS considers itself Moroccan, is convinced that it has vital stakes in the political process in Rabat, and is determined to have its say there. Indeed, foreign observers reported vibrant voting and political discourse throughout MWS. As well, no violations and improprieties were reported. Thus, the Moroccan parliamentary elections in MWS proved that the local population considers itself an integral part of a single, unified Morocco.
Meanwhile, the international community has become increasingly alarmed by failed ministates, such as Timor-Leste, and unchecked secessionism. Even the most ardent supporters of the “Sahrawi people” in the West now doubt the viability of a POLISARIO-run state. The West sees no need for another failed state and bastion of criminality, living off the smuggling routes between west-central Africa and Western Europe. All expert studies have demonstrated that a POLISARIO-run state cannot sustain any other type of economy on its own; industrial and resource development are impossible without reliance on the infrastructure and human resources of Morocco while POLISARIO advocates the complete delinking of MWS from Morocco. Hence, particularly after the POLISARIO’s intransigence in the UN-run Manhasset, New York, talks in early August 2007, international support for Morocco’s autonomy plan — with all its possible imperfections — has started to grow.
The UN-run negotiations process, however, is effectively stalled because of major legal issues raised by the US. Because of prior and much stronger commitments by the US George W. Bush White House to the independence of Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, Nagorno-Karabakh, the US insists that these policies should also serve as a precedent for all other similar conflicts, including MWS. Indeed, the US still insists on a referendum and optional independence for MWS, even when the Bush Administration itself is on the record favoring autonomy within Morocco as the optimal solution for the MWS.
Both the POLISARIO and their Algerian patrons (as well as Cuba and South Africa) have relied heavily on the US legal maneuvering in order to legitimize their own intransigence. However, both POLISARIO and Algiers are apprehensive that they will not be able to sustain their uncompromising “No” for long because of the growing international awareness of the population’s desire for normal life within the Moroccan state. And so, in mid-December 2007, the POLISARIO congress in Tifariti aimed to coerce international support for the POLISARIO’s hardline position by threatening the resumption of the armed struggle.
In his speech in Tifariti, POLISARIO Secretary-General Mohammed Abdelaziz stressed the imperative of the Sahrawis’ “just war of liberation”. This war, he stated, “will continue until its noble objectives are realized, however long it may take, whatever moves the colonists make and whatever means of struggle are authorized by international resolutions”.
Abdelaziz declared that, led by POLISARIO, the Sahrawis were determined “to fight to protect our rights by all means, by peaceful resistance and armed conflict”. Abdelaziz stated that only an “uprising” could break the deadlock in the UN-sponsored talks with Morocco. He then described and rejected the UN diplomatic overtures and called for direct negotiations as instruments for legitimizing Morocco’s enduring occupation of MWS. Abdelaziz left the clear impression that there was no alternative to undertaking drastic measures — such as the resumption of the armed struggle — if MWS was to be “liberated” by POLISARIO. Indeed, at the conclusion of the Tifariti congress, the POLISARIO Frente resolved to rearm and prepare for a new war which would be launched by 2009 if the diplomatic process could not deliver POLISARIO’s demands for full independence.
The local population, mainly the tribes living in MWS, were clearly alarmed by the call to arms. Hence, tribal leaders led by Himad Walid Al-Darwish organized unprecedented demonstrations in southern MWS, near the border with Mauritania. The demonstrators urged the POLISARIO congress to heed to the will of the people they claimed to be representing, reject the armed struggle, accept the Moroccan autonomy plan, and concentrate on the peaceful development of MWS. The protesters also urged the UN to address the issue of the refugees in Tindouf. This was the first time that both prominent regional and tribal leaders as well as grassroots population openly challenged POLISARIO and its claim to representing the “Sahrawi people”.
However, what makes POLISARIO’s threat to resume the armed struggle so ominous — beyond the continued military build-up of POLISARIO in its Algerian sanctuaries — is its impact on the Algerian succession crisis. Pres. Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s health has deteriorated recently. With no heir apparent, inner struggles are intensifying within the Algerian Government. Most important is the succession struggle between the “army élite” and the “energy lobby”, both comprised of most senior officials and their cronies. Furthermore, each of these groups is further divided into pro-Russia, pro-France, and pro-US sub-groupings. Therefore, all decisions are made as a result of power-maneuvers between at least six “clans” which confront each other and win through transient and narrow-issue alliances.
The “army elite” and some in the “energy lobby” believe that crisis and war are the quickest way — a shortcut — to the post-Bouteflika throne. In recent years, Bouteflika preferred to stay neutral. When he had to take a side, he tilted with the “energy lobby”, which generated US and Western support. However, in recent months, Pres. Bouteflika has clearly tilted toward, and even openly sided with, the “army élite”. While Bouteflika made his move because he believes the military élite is better suited to sustain him in power and follow his policies, he will have to “pay” for the military support by heightening the regional tension even if it leads to war with Morocco.
Meanwhile, Pres. Bouteflika must also generate international support and legitimization for his crackdown of the jihadists and his continued presidency. Toward this end, intelligence emerging from Algiers indicates that he plans to rely on the growing threat of eruption of violence in MWS, giving new life and importance to a process started in late-November 2007 in order to generate international pressure on Morocco. The US-led West could not tolerate a regional war and a threat to the flow of oil/gas from Algeria to Western Europe. Moreover, US officials have indicated privately that they were afraid that in case of war, Algeria would increase its weapons acquisition from Russia, thus increasing Russia’s access to, and influence in, the Western Mediterranean. Hence, Algiers is encouraging POLISARIO to threaten the resumption of war in MWS unless its demands are met at the UN.
Ultimately, Pres. Bouteflika is correct in his reading of Western politics. Because the escalation of terrorism has only negligible impact on the West, the West can afford to pressure Algeria to “behave”. On the other hand, a regional war would impact vital interests of the West. Therefore, the West would tolerate whatever it takes to prevent it, including placating Bouteflika by looking the other way on his crackdown and prolonged presidency.
As a result, Algerian diplomats are already warning Western governments about the explosive potential of the POLISARIO congress in Tifariti. The Algerians claim they cannot deal with two threats at the same time. They prefer, they say, to concentrate on fighting al-Qaida. However, the deadlocked talks between Morocco and POLISARIO already create an explosive situation. The Sahrawi people are, they say, in such despair over the lack of progress and the US support for the Moroccan autonomy position, that there are strong voices to abandon the political process and resume the war.
The resolutions of the POLISARIO congress do reflect the grassroots’ mood, the Algerians stress. The demands for the resumption of violence in the hope of breaking out of the despair and deadlock are really strong and Algiers has indicated that it was not sure the POLISARIO leadership could prevent fringe elements from picking-up guns and thus sparking a wider crisis/war. The Algerians warned that given the extent of brotherhood between the Algerian and Sahrawi peoples, Algiers would not be able to refuse help to their brethren once violence erupted. The Algerian public would not, they have said, tolerate abandoning their Sahrawi brethren to “Moroccan oppression” and suppression, and would demand that Algiers took whatever steps were required to “liberate” MWS from Moroccan occupation. Under such circumstances, the Algerians have warned, Algiers would have to abandon the confrontation with al-Qaida. So, the Algerian logic goes, if the West wants Algiers to prioritize the confrontation with al-Qaida, then the West must “deliver” the MWS to POLISARIO.
Thus, since the West must “deliver” the MWS to POLISARIO, since Bouteflika has to “pay” for the military support to his continued presidency by heightening the regional tension even if it leads to war with Morocco, and since the POLISARIO leadership has cornered itself by resolving that the resumption of the armed struggle is the sole viable alternative to the grassroots’ yearning for normalization under a Moroccan flag, it will now take only a small spark to flare the volatile Maghreb.
Thursday, December 20, 2007
Sunday, November 4, 2007
Morocco’s F-16 Deal: It’s Not Done Until It’s Done
US officials have conveniently leaked the “fact” that the Royal Moroccan Air Force has agreed to buy 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D fighter aircraft for something less than US$2 billion, thus driving out the competition from France, which had hoped to sell some 24 AMD Rafale fighters — a much more advanced combat aircraft than the F-16 — for around US2.3 billion. But the deal is far from wrapped up. Sure, the F-16 deal is attractive: more numbers of a still-pretty-good second/third generation fighter for a much cheaper price. But real questions persist for Morocco.
Firstly, will the F-16s, even if the RMAF gets truly advanced versions, be able to match neighboring Algeria’s 28 new Su-30 air superiority fighters which were ordered in 2006? On a one-on-one air combat engagement, almost certainly not, unless the RMAF has some really significant additional sensors and command and control capabilities from the US, to go along with the aircraft. Frankly, Algeria also has a lot more than just the new Su-30s, but that would be Morocco’s primary threat, along with the 24 Mikoyan MiG-29A and 8 MiG-29UB Fulcrum air superiority fighters already in service and demonstrably capable of defeating F-16s in air combat maneuvering.
Secondly, quite apart from operational capability, will the US even allow Morocco to use the new fighters where and when they will be needed? What we are seeing now is the standard US negotiating tactic. First, get an agreement to buy, locking out the foreign competition, and then start hedging the sale with conditions on deployment, and on just what onboard systems will be sold to make the aircraft truly effective.
As well, the negotiations are just beginning on exactly what “Block” of F-16 the US will allow for sale to the RMAF. At worst, given Morocco’s position as a major non-NATO US ally, it should be at least the Block 52, similar to that being negotiated for Pakistan, but in reality, to match the Su-30s of Algeria, it would need to be at least Block 60 (à la the United Arab Emirates).
Certainly, the price is important for Morocco, even if Saudi Arabia helps out somewhat with the budget, as promised. But Morocco needs to be able to present a credible deterrence against Algerian use of force to support and sustain its surrogate force — POLISARIO — which is trying to break Morocco’s Saharan territory away from the Kingdom. Right now, Morocco is maneuvering brilliantly to make its case in the international community regarding the historical validity of Morocco as the legitimate owner of what was, for a time, the colonial territory of “Spanish Sahara”. The African states which Algeria had wooed into recognizing POLISARIO as the claimant to the area have now begun walking away from that position ... in large numbers. And no Arab League states ever supported Algeria on that.
Algeria, however, is determined to gain access through a surrogate POLISARIO state to the Atlantic. And expansionist Algeria has fought with Morocco before over border issues. And lost. Its massive new arms build-up, including the Su-30s and much more, are designed to ensure that Morocco’s adroit political maneuvering will not be a match for brute force in the future.
Morocco is, arguably, far more strategically important to the US than Algeria, and yet the US State Department seems bent, always, on treating Morocco with less support than its record as an unimpeachable ally should warrant. So there is an attempt to circumscribe the use of the F-16s, and to limit their capabilities.
Morocco needs to keep the door open to a possible acquisition of Rafales. They could indeed match the Su-30s, and ensure that the close Moroccan relationship with France — enhanced since the election to the French Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy — is strengthened and France’s also-important relationship with Algeria is circumscribed.
Indeed, Washington, for its part, needs to start taking into account the reality of history on Moroccan Sahara and also the growing democratic governance of Morocco, and start seeing Algeria’s constant attempts to expand for what they are.
We'll be talking more about Morocco’s great electoral transformation in the September 2007 elections, and about some great documentation on the realities of Saharan history.
Firstly, will the F-16s, even if the RMAF gets truly advanced versions, be able to match neighboring Algeria’s 28 new Su-30 air superiority fighters which were ordered in 2006? On a one-on-one air combat engagement, almost certainly not, unless the RMAF has some really significant additional sensors and command and control capabilities from the US, to go along with the aircraft. Frankly, Algeria also has a lot more than just the new Su-30s, but that would be Morocco’s primary threat, along with the 24 Mikoyan MiG-29A and 8 MiG-29UB Fulcrum air superiority fighters already in service and demonstrably capable of defeating F-16s in air combat maneuvering.
Secondly, quite apart from operational capability, will the US even allow Morocco to use the new fighters where and when they will be needed? What we are seeing now is the standard US negotiating tactic. First, get an agreement to buy, locking out the foreign competition, and then start hedging the sale with conditions on deployment, and on just what onboard systems will be sold to make the aircraft truly effective.
As well, the negotiations are just beginning on exactly what “Block” of F-16 the US will allow for sale to the RMAF. At worst, given Morocco’s position as a major non-NATO US ally, it should be at least the Block 52, similar to that being negotiated for Pakistan, but in reality, to match the Su-30s of Algeria, it would need to be at least Block 60 (à la the United Arab Emirates).
Certainly, the price is important for Morocco, even if Saudi Arabia helps out somewhat with the budget, as promised. But Morocco needs to be able to present a credible deterrence against Algerian use of force to support and sustain its surrogate force — POLISARIO — which is trying to break Morocco’s Saharan territory away from the Kingdom. Right now, Morocco is maneuvering brilliantly to make its case in the international community regarding the historical validity of Morocco as the legitimate owner of what was, for a time, the colonial territory of “Spanish Sahara”. The African states which Algeria had wooed into recognizing POLISARIO as the claimant to the area have now begun walking away from that position ... in large numbers. And no Arab League states ever supported Algeria on that.
Algeria, however, is determined to gain access through a surrogate POLISARIO state to the Atlantic. And expansionist Algeria has fought with Morocco before over border issues. And lost. Its massive new arms build-up, including the Su-30s and much more, are designed to ensure that Morocco’s adroit political maneuvering will not be a match for brute force in the future.
Morocco is, arguably, far more strategically important to the US than Algeria, and yet the US State Department seems bent, always, on treating Morocco with less support than its record as an unimpeachable ally should warrant. So there is an attempt to circumscribe the use of the F-16s, and to limit their capabilities.
Morocco needs to keep the door open to a possible acquisition of Rafales. They could indeed match the Su-30s, and ensure that the close Moroccan relationship with France — enhanced since the election to the French Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy — is strengthened and France’s also-important relationship with Algeria is circumscribed.
Indeed, Washington, for its part, needs to start taking into account the reality of history on Moroccan Sahara and also the growing democratic governance of Morocco, and start seeing Algeria’s constant attempts to expand for what they are.
We'll be talking more about Morocco’s great electoral transformation in the September 2007 elections, and about some great documentation on the realities of Saharan history.
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Morocco’s Elections, New Initiatives Give Hope to the Sahrawi People
Morocco’s September 7, 2007, elections demonstrated far more than anything else that the Kingdom has begun to turn the tide in the Maghreb. For years, Morocco has been on the receiving end of “initiatives” sponsored by its opponents on the question of the future of its Saharan territory, in particular. Now, as the national elections have proven, the levels of prosperity, participation, and freedom have become entrenched in the Kingdom; support for King Mohammed VI’s initiatives have been overwhelmingly endorsed.
Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Benaïssa, also on October 1, 2007, told the United Nations General Assembly’s annual high-level debate that the turning point in the discussions about the future of Moroccan Sahara “results from the dynamic created by the Moroccan Initiative on a Statute of Autonomy”, which he said “has opened promising perspectives for overcoming the stalemate this issue faces at the UN level”.
Morocco could never have fought, dollar for propaganda dollar, the political and proxy guerilla war for the preservation of its borders and territories against the oil-funded might of the Algerians. The only way to win the debate was, as the King knew, to give Morocco a level of economic growth and freedom, as well as political freedom, widespread education and a very free press, which would develop the Kingdom as the significant economic hub of the Maghreb.
The plan is working. Algeria’s commitment to old-fashioned leftism and military rule has left that country frustrated and in decline, sustained only by the foreign exploitation of its oil and gas reserves. Ultimately, this wealth — which never fully filters down to the people — cannot match the economic and social vibrance which Morocco is achieving.
The brilliant sociologist, Prof. Mohamed Cherkaoui, in his new book, “Morocco and the Sahara: Social Bonds and Geopolitical Issues”, noted: “... [I]t must not be forgotten that Morocco has neither oil nor gas. Phosphates and their derivatives no longer constitute an important source of revenue. In reality, the sole resource on which the Kingdom can count is the human being.”
With the Algerian surrogate, POLISARIO, being further isolated politically in the international arena, and with Algeria buying more and more advanced Russian weaponry, it must be asked how Algeria’s leaders will respond to the fact that they have, finally, lost the initiative on the future of the Moroccan Sahara. They cannot have it; they cannot steal it by proxy. And they see Morocco’s economic, social, and real strength rising.
Will they now see the benefits of achieving a peace which will benefit the entire Maghreb? Or will they lash out?
Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Benaïssa, also on October 1, 2007, told the United Nations General Assembly’s annual high-level debate that the turning point in the discussions about the future of Moroccan Sahara “results from the dynamic created by the Moroccan Initiative on a Statute of Autonomy”, which he said “has opened promising perspectives for overcoming the stalemate this issue faces at the UN level”.
Morocco could never have fought, dollar for propaganda dollar, the political and proxy guerilla war for the preservation of its borders and territories against the oil-funded might of the Algerians. The only way to win the debate was, as the King knew, to give Morocco a level of economic growth and freedom, as well as political freedom, widespread education and a very free press, which would develop the Kingdom as the significant economic hub of the Maghreb.
The plan is working. Algeria’s commitment to old-fashioned leftism and military rule has left that country frustrated and in decline, sustained only by the foreign exploitation of its oil and gas reserves. Ultimately, this wealth — which never fully filters down to the people — cannot match the economic and social vibrance which Morocco is achieving.
The brilliant sociologist, Prof. Mohamed Cherkaoui, in his new book, “Morocco and the Sahara: Social Bonds and Geopolitical Issues”, noted: “... [I]t must not be forgotten that Morocco has neither oil nor gas. Phosphates and their derivatives no longer constitute an important source of revenue. In reality, the sole resource on which the Kingdom can count is the human being.”
With the Algerian surrogate, POLISARIO, being further isolated politically in the international arena, and with Algeria buying more and more advanced Russian weaponry, it must be asked how Algeria’s leaders will respond to the fact that they have, finally, lost the initiative on the future of the Moroccan Sahara. They cannot have it; they cannot steal it by proxy. And they see Morocco’s economic, social, and real strength rising.
Will they now see the benefits of achieving a peace which will benefit the entire Maghreb? Or will they lash out?
Saturday, September 8, 2007
Australia’s Next Labor Government Supporting Slave Holding Insurgents in the Sahara
Why is the main labor movement in Australia – the main force behind the probable next Government of Australia – supporting an organization which still maintains slaves as its workforce? The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), which provides the principal policy, financial, and voting support for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) of Prime Ministerial aspirant Kevin Rudd provides financial aid to POLISARIO, the Algerian-backed insurgency movement which is trying to break the Moroccan Saharan territory away from Moroccan control.
The quiet support which much of the Australian labor movement, and, indeed, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), has given to POLISARIO over the years was shaken when, on May 2, 2007, POLISARIO — Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) — detained two Australian film journalists who had traditionally been supportive of the POLISARIO movement.
The reason? They had discovered that the Algerian-backed insurgency movement kept African slaves in their squalid refugee camps.
Media reporting says that POLISARIO held the two Australian documentary filmmakers, Violeta Ayala and Daniel Fallshaw, for only about five hours before releasing them for filming the slaves. They also confiscated the Australians’ cellphone, but not before a call had gone out to Australian authorities that they had been arrested. Australian sources say that it took strong threats from the Australian Government before the two were released, including the threat to reverse the traditionally supportive approach which the Australian Foreign Affairs Department had traditionally taken with POLISARIO.
POLISARIO, significantly, denied detaining the reporters, but they have told their story widely since leaving Algeria.
But it is significant that the Australian media has not questioned why POLISARIO is able to get donations through the Australian trade union movement, which offers a method for Australian private citizens to make tax-exempt donations to POLISARIO. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) division called “Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad Inc.” (APHEDA), based in Sydney, has a “Union Aid Abroad” movement which works, as it says, “in alliance with the Australia Western Sahara Association”, which is an arm of POLISARIO.
What is equally significant is that the Australian Government has made it difficult for charities in Australia to gain tax-exempt status even when raising funds for Rwandan orphaned children, for example. And yet the ACTU has found a means to offer tax relief on donations to a terrorist organization which actually maintains a workforce of slaves in abject conditions.
Moreover, the same network of support in Australia for POLISARIO has links into the support movement for the (then) marxist FRETILIN movement which fought for the independence of East Timor, and which even after winning Australian support for its independence struggle, has essentially turned its back on Australia since East Timor gained statehood.
The quiet support which much of the Australian labor movement, and, indeed, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), has given to POLISARIO over the years was shaken when, on May 2, 2007, POLISARIO — Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) — detained two Australian film journalists who had traditionally been supportive of the POLISARIO movement.
The reason? They had discovered that the Algerian-backed insurgency movement kept African slaves in their squalid refugee camps.
Media reporting says that POLISARIO held the two Australian documentary filmmakers, Violeta Ayala and Daniel Fallshaw, for only about five hours before releasing them for filming the slaves. They also confiscated the Australians’ cellphone, but not before a call had gone out to Australian authorities that they had been arrested. Australian sources say that it took strong threats from the Australian Government before the two were released, including the threat to reverse the traditionally supportive approach which the Australian Foreign Affairs Department had traditionally taken with POLISARIO.
POLISARIO, significantly, denied detaining the reporters, but they have told their story widely since leaving Algeria.
But it is significant that the Australian media has not questioned why POLISARIO is able to get donations through the Australian trade union movement, which offers a method for Australian private citizens to make tax-exempt donations to POLISARIO. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) division called “Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad Inc.” (APHEDA), based in Sydney, has a “Union Aid Abroad” movement which works, as it says, “in alliance with the Australia Western Sahara Association”, which is an arm of POLISARIO.
What is equally significant is that the Australian Government has made it difficult for charities in Australia to gain tax-exempt status even when raising funds for Rwandan orphaned children, for example. And yet the ACTU has found a means to offer tax relief on donations to a terrorist organization which actually maintains a workforce of slaves in abject conditions.
Moreover, the same network of support in Australia for POLISARIO has links into the support movement for the (then) marxist FRETILIN movement which fought for the independence of East Timor, and which even after winning Australian support for its independence struggle, has essentially turned its back on Australia since East Timor gained statehood.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)