Sunday, November 4, 2007

Morocco’s F-16 Deal: It’s Not Done Until It’s Done

US officials have conveniently leaked the “fact” that the Royal Moroccan Air Force has agreed to buy 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D fighter aircraft for something less than US$2 billion, thus driving out the competition from France, which had hoped to sell some 24 AMD Rafale fighters — a much more advanced combat aircraft than the F-16 — for around US2.3 billion. But the deal is far from wrapped up. Sure, the F-16 deal is attractive: more numbers of a still-pretty-good second/third generation fighter for a much cheaper price. But real questions persist for Morocco.

Firstly, will the F-16s, even if the RMAF gets truly advanced versions, be able to match neighboring Algeria’s 28 new Su-30 air superiority fighters which were ordered in 2006? On a one-on-one air combat engagement, almost certainly not, unless the RMAF has some really significant additional sensors and command and control capabilities from the US, to go along with the aircraft. Frankly, Algeria also has a lot more than just the new Su-30s, but that would be Morocco’s primary threat, along with the 24 Mikoyan MiG-29A and 8 MiG-29UB Fulcrum air superiority fighters already in service and demonstrably capable of defeating F-16s in air combat maneuvering.

Secondly, quite apart from operational capability, will the US even allow Morocco to use the new fighters where and when they will be needed? What we are seeing now is the standard US negotiating tactic. First, get an agreement to buy, locking out the foreign competition, and then start hedging the sale with conditions on deployment, and on just what onboard systems will be sold to make the aircraft truly effective.

As well, the negotiations are just beginning on exactly what “Block” of F-16 the US will allow for sale to the RMAF. At worst, given Morocco’s position as a major non-NATO US ally, it should be at least the Block 52, similar to that being negotiated for Pakistan, but in reality, to match the Su-30s of Algeria, it would need to be at least Block 60 (à la the United Arab Emirates).

Certainly, the price is important for Morocco, even if Saudi Arabia helps out somewhat with the budget, as promised. But Morocco needs to be able to present a credible deterrence against Algerian use of force to support and sustain its surrogate force — POLISARIO — which is trying to break Morocco’s Saharan territory away from the Kingdom. Right now, Morocco is maneuvering brilliantly to make its case in the international community regarding the historical validity of Morocco as the legitimate owner of what was, for a time, the colonial territory of “Spanish Sahara”. The African states which Algeria had wooed into recognizing POLISARIO as the claimant to the area have now begun walking away from that position ... in large numbers. And no Arab League states ever supported Algeria on that.

Algeria, however, is determined to gain access through a surrogate POLISARIO state to the Atlantic. And expansionist Algeria has fought with Morocco before over border issues. And lost. Its massive new arms build-up, including the Su-30s and much more, are designed to ensure that Morocco’s adroit political maneuvering will not be a match for brute force in the future.

Morocco is, arguably, far more strategically important to the US than Algeria, and yet the US State Department seems bent, always, on treating Morocco with less support than its record as an unimpeachable ally should warrant. So there is an attempt to circumscribe the use of the F-16s, and to limit their capabilities.

Morocco needs to keep the door open to a possible acquisition of Rafales. They could indeed match the Su-30s, and ensure that the close Moroccan relationship with France — enhanced since the election to the French Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy — is strengthened and France’s also-important relationship with Algeria is circumscribed.

Indeed, Washington, for its part, needs to start taking into account the reality of history on Moroccan Sahara and also the growing democratic governance of Morocco, and start seeing Algeria’s constant attempts to expand for what they are.
We'll be talking more about Morocco’s great electoral transformation in the September 2007 elections, and about some great documentation on the realities of Saharan history.

Tuesday, October 2, 2007

Morocco’s Elections, New Initiatives Give Hope to the Sahrawi People

Morocco’s September 7, 2007, elections demonstrated far more than anything else that the Kingdom has begun to turn the tide in the Maghreb. For years, Morocco has been on the receiving end of “initiatives” sponsored by its opponents on the question of the future of its Saharan territory, in particular. Now, as the national elections have proven, the levels of prosperity, participation, and freedom have become entrenched in the Kingdom; support for King Mohammed VI’s initiatives have been overwhelmingly endorsed.

Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Benaïssa, also on October 1, 2007, told the United Nations General Assembly’s annual high-level debate that the turning point in the discussions about the future of Moroccan Sahara “results from the dynamic created by the Moroccan Initiative on a Statute of Autonomy”, which he said “has opened promising perspectives for overcoming the stalemate this issue faces at the UN level”.

Morocco could never have fought, dollar for propaganda dollar, the political and proxy guerilla war for the preservation of its borders and territories against the oil-funded might of the Algerians. The only way to win the debate was, as the King knew, to give Morocco a level of economic growth and freedom, as well as political freedom, widespread education and a very free press, which would develop the Kingdom as the significant economic hub of the Maghreb.

The plan is working. Algeria’s commitment to old-fashioned leftism and military rule has left that country frustrated and in decline, sustained only by the foreign exploitation of its oil and gas reserves. Ultimately, this wealth — which never fully filters down to the people — cannot match the economic and social vibrance which Morocco is achieving.

The brilliant sociologist, Prof. Mohamed Cherkaoui, in his new book, “Morocco and the Sahara: Social Bonds and Geopolitical Issues”, noted: “... [I]t must not be forgotten that Morocco has neither oil nor gas. Phosphates and their derivatives no longer constitute an important source of revenue. In reality, the sole resource on which the Kingdom can count is the human being.”

With the Algerian surrogate, POLISARIO, being further isolated politically in the international arena, and with Algeria buying more and more advanced Russian weaponry, it must be asked how Algeria’s leaders will respond to the fact that they have, finally, lost the initiative on the future of the Moroccan Sahara. They cannot have it; they cannot steal it by proxy. And they see Morocco’s economic, social, and real strength rising.

Will they now see the benefits of achieving a peace which will benefit the entire Maghreb? Or will they lash out?

Saturday, September 8, 2007

Australia’s Next Labor Government Supporting Slave Holding Insurgents in the Sahara

Why is the main labor movement in Australia – the main force behind the probable next Government of Australia – supporting an organization which still maintains slaves as its workforce? The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), which provides the principal policy, financial, and voting support for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) of Prime Ministerial aspirant Kevin Rudd provides financial aid to POLISARIO, the Algerian-backed insurgency movement which is trying to break the Moroccan Saharan territory away from Moroccan control.

The quiet support which much of the Australian labor movement, and, indeed, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), has given to POLISARIO over the years was shaken when, on May 2, 2007, POLISARIO — Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) — detained two Australian film journalists who had traditionally been supportive of the POLISARIO movement.

The reason? They had discovered that the Algerian-backed insurgency movement kept African slaves in their squalid refugee camps.

Media reporting says that POLISARIO held the two Australian documentary filmmakers, Violeta Ayala and Daniel Fallshaw, for only about five hours before releasing them for filming the slaves. They also confiscated the Australians’ cellphone, but not before a call had gone out to Australian authorities that they had been arrested. Australian sources say that it took strong threats from the Australian Government before the two were released, including the threat to reverse the traditionally supportive approach which the Australian Foreign Affairs Department had traditionally taken with POLISARIO.

POLISARIO, significantly, denied detaining the reporters, but they have told their story widely since leaving Algeria.

But it is significant that the Australian media has not questioned why POLISARIO is able to get donations through the Australian trade union movement, which offers a method for Australian private citizens to make tax-exempt donations to POLISARIO. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) division called “Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad Inc.” (APHEDA), based in Sydney, has a “Union Aid Abroad” movement which works, as it says, “in alliance with the Australia Western Sahara Association”, which is an arm of POLISARIO.

What is equally significant is that the Australian Government has made it difficult for charities in Australia to gain tax-exempt status even when raising funds for Rwandan orphaned children, for example. And yet the ACTU has found a means to offer tax relief on donations to a terrorist organization which actually maintains a workforce of slaves in abject conditions.

Moreover, the same network of support in Australia for POLISARIO has links into the support movement for the (then) marxist FRETILIN movement which fought for the independence of East Timor, and which even after winning Australian support for its independence struggle, has essentially turned its back on Australia since East Timor gained statehood.